Self-paced
Historian: There is no direct evidence that timber was traded between the ancient nations of Poran and Nayal, but the fact that Support a law setting tariffs on timber imports from Poran was enacted during the third Nayalese dynasty does Conclusion suggest that during that period a timber trade was conducted.
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Structure: Counter-Argument
The historian argues that, though there isn't any direct evidence for a timber trade between Poran and Nayal, the fact that a law about timber imports from Poran was enacted in the third Nayalese dynasty indicates that those two nations did conduct a timber trade at that time.
The critic rejects the historian's argument, appealing to the fact that in today's legal system, many laws still remain on the books regulating activities that used to be common but are no longer performed.
Analysis: Structure of Flawed Response
Notice that the critic's response is an argument by analogy: since there are laws today that regulate activities that are no longer performed, by analogy (the critic argues), the Nayalese law might not be evidence that a timber trade was conducted in the period the historian identifies. But for an analogy to work, the situations actually have to be analogous — and these two situations are not.
The critic is talking about laws that have "remained" — i.e., that were enacted in the past, presumably when an activity was common, and are still on the books even though that activity is no longer performed. But the historian is talking specifically about the time period when the law was first enacted, arguing that if the Nayalese bothered to make a new law regulating timber imports from Poran, it seems likely that in that time period the two nations had a timber trade. So the critic's analogy doesn't actually apply to the historian's argument.
22.
The critic’s response to the █████████ ██ ██████ ███████ ██
a
produces evidence that ██ ██████████ ████ █████ ███ ██████ ████ ███ ██████ █████ ███████ █████ ███ █████ ██████ ███ █████ ████████ ███████
Incorrect. The critic's argument doesn't provide any evidence related to Poran or Nayal.
b
cites current laws ███████ ██████████ ███████ ███ ████ █████ ███ ████████ ██ ███ ██████ █████
Incorrect. It's true that the critic never specifies if these laws relate to the timber trade, but they don't have to for his analogy to work. His case is broadly about whether laws can work as evidence for a practice being performed, which certainly applies to the historian's argument. The real flaw is that the critic is talking about the evidentiary value of laws after they have been enacted, whereas the historian is talking about the enactment of a new law as evidence in itself.
c
fails to recognize ████ ███ █████████████ ██████████ ███ █████ ██ ████████ ████████ ██████ ████ ██████ ████████
Incorrect. We don't know what the historian considers "direct" evidence, but it's clear that she believes that the enactment of a new law is indirect evidence, since she mentions it as evidence after saying that no direct evidence exists for the timber trade. The critic questions whether this evidence actually shows what the historian claims it does. But he doesn't suggest that the historian's argument relies on "direct" evidence (whatever that means) instead of indirect evidence. The historian has offered an argument based on legal evidence, and the critic offers a response related to legal evidence. We can guess the historian would consider both arguments to be about indirect evidence, and as for the critic, the direct versus indirect distinction just doesn't show up in his argument.
d
takes no account ██ ███ ██████████ ███████ █ ███████ █████████ ██ █ ██████████ ████ ███ █ ███████ █████████ ██ ████ ██ █ █████ ████ ██ █ ██████████ ████
Correct. The critic tries to undermine the historian's argument by appealing to modern cases where laws related to some activity have stayed on the books even after that activity is no longer performed. This would be a valid analogy if the historian had been appealing to the mere existence of a law on the books as evidence for the timber trade in the third Nayalese dynasty. But the historian is specifically pointing to the enactment of a timber trade-related law as evidence for the timber trade's existence at the time. So the critic's analogy doesn't actually apply to this argument.
e
accepts without question ███ ██████████ █████ ███ ███████ ██ ████ ████ █████████ ███ █████████████ ████████
Incorrect. Neither the critic's nor the historian's argument contains any strong suggestions about the purpose of laws.