I'm in PA and would love to stay in the loop!

Honestly, I would focus on improving your GPA for now. The LSAT will still be there for you afterwards, but once your GPA is established you can't change it any more.

(Q27): (A) arguably also is wrong because it is not clear whether the theoretical developments described in the second paragraph took place earlier than the 1930s. Paragraphs one and two do locate these developments in the time period preceding the one from 1934-1939, but these developments still might have taken place during the 1930s, namely from 1930-1934.

So (A) remains ambiguous, not explicitly supported. The passage does not indicate that the physics community in the 1930s neglected "earlier" theoretical developments, because it remains unclear whether the theoretical developments described as neglected occurred prior to 1930.

Also note that these neglected developments themselves were orchestrated by physicists, according to paragraph two. So even if these developments occurred prior to 1930, it would seem questionable whether you could indeed describe them as neglected by the "physics community" as a whole because at least some physicists do in fact seem to endorse them.

By contrast, the correct answer choice (E) is not subject to these ambiguities and thus better supported than (A).

Preponderance: "Superiority in amount or number; the bulk or majority; also, a large amount or number; an abundance, a profusion."

Two Flaws:

(1) Too small a sample (Looking at five dentists to make a claim about the dental profession generally).

(2) Scope flaw: Author assumes that "the most effective cavity fighting formula in a toothpaste" automatically qualifies as "the best way to fight cavities" generally. Perhaps there is an even better way to fight cavities that does not involve toothpastes, e.g. flossing or eating a healthy diet?

Only (D) matches both flaws: 10 voters are too small a sample to make a claim about the nation generally; the scope flaw also happens ("Gomez's policies are better than all others, therefore electing Gomez would be the best way to help the nation." Perhaps there are even better ways to help the nation than to vote for a politician who seeks to implement certain policies, e.g. to do volunteer work or to boost the economy?). All other answer choices lack one or both of these flaws.

(A) Small sample size, but the scope flaw does not seem parallel. (A) says: "G would be a popular leader, therefore G would be best for the nation." To be parallel, (A) would have to say: "G would be THE MOST popular leader, therefore G would be best for our nation."

(B) No switch from a small sample to an entire population. A scope flaw does happen ("best policies, therefore best for the nation").

(C) Does not have too small a sample. A scope flaw does happen ("best policies, therefore best for our nation").

(E) Small sample size, but "we" is weird - is "we" here the population as a whole? We don't know; there is no guarantee that this indeed matches the broad generalization in the original argument. "Help the nation" again lacks the comparative element characterizing the scope issue in the original argument. To be parallel, (E) would have to say "Electing G would help the nation more than electing anyone else, therefore electing G is the best course for the nation to follow."

I did not like (A) as a right answer choice because we technically don't know whether Hanlon's claim is backed up by extraordinary evidence. Certainly the fact that Hanlon is a trusted member of the community does not rise to the standard, but is there further evidence that speaks in Hanlon's favor? We do not know; the argument never says that Hanlon's status as a community member is the ONLY backup that Hanlon has for their claims.

To resolve this concern, the best way seems to be to restrict the domain we are talking about. Certainly in the argument in the stimulus Hanlon's status is the only evidence produced in Hanlon's favor; if we focus on this argument alone (A) does seem to apply.

(C) and (D) both go after the administrator's premise 'We have TAs only because this allows them to fund their education,' but (C) challenges this premise more effectively. (D) has more ambiguity ('most' could also just be 51%, and funding tuition does not have to mean also funding all of their education). By contrast, (C) in and of itself directly challenges the premise without being open to interpretation or requiring additional assumptions.

The stipends in (D) are also somewhat unclear to me. Are they identical to the financial compensations that the TAs receive for teaching? Or are these stipends independent of these compensations / an additional form of funding? The fact that (D) raises so many interpretative issues strikes me as a red flag.

Takeaways: Re-read this multiple times, color code the argument structure, really be careful with the answer choices and weigh them carefully against another. Choose the one that has the least problems / is not open to interpretation or in need of additional assumptions.

Notice how the LSAT is announcing this not as a parallel flaw question but as a parallel reasoning one, even though the argument arguably contains a belief / fact confusion (having no indication of signs for life vs. the signs do not exist). So the LSAT must intend this argument to run as follows:

(P1) LIFE -> SIGNS

(P2) Not SIGNS

(MC) Therefore, not LIFE

(E) mirrors this:

(P1) PLAN -> (MOVEMENTS or TRANSFER)

(P2) Not (MOVEMENTS or TRANSFER)

(MC) Therefore, not PLAN

(A) does not mirror the stimulus:

(P1) Know: SPY -> TRAITOR

(P2) Don't know: GENERAL -> TRAITOR

(MC) Therefore, GENERAL -> Not SPY

(A) in fact brings in the belief / fact confusion that the stimulus suggests, but (A) seems invalid and confuses the scope of the negation; it applies to the knowledge claim and not the general. Since the stimulus is supposed to amount to a valid argument (parallel reasoning, not parallel flaw!), (A) can't be right.

Takeaways: Read carefully; formalize in writing if there is time to get a better sense of the structures of the arguments being considered.

On (Q20): We want to make the following claims compatible with another: (1) 'It is not the case that a pathological liar's lying gives you a sufficient reason to lie to them.' (2) For any rational being, if they treat you in a certain way, they in doing so authorize you to treat them in the same way.

Are these claims incompatible in the first place? Arguably yes, due to 'reason:' Passage A is saying, having a pathological liar lie to you does not give you a reason to lie back at them, whereas the first paragraph of B is saying that such liars authorize you to lie back at them.

(B): Pathological liars are not rational beings and thus fall outside the scope of the argument.

(D): Rights and duties to lie to pathological liars are different.

Why is (B) better here than (D)? (D) arguably would be very good if it said 'Rights and duties to pathological liars are different from another, being lied to only gives you a right to lie back at them, and having a right to lie to somebody is not a sufficient reason to in fact use this right.' That is, for (D) to work, we would need to add further assumptions, which the answer choice itself does not provide.

By contrast, (B) is less open to interpretation / requires no additional assumptions, and just straight up tells us that claim (1) does not fall within the scope of the argument in the first paragraph of passage B, thus making them at a minimum not incompatible.

Ranking: B > D > A, C, E

My difficulty in answering this question comes from the use of 'sufficient reason,' which I took to mean 'sufficient condition.' On this reading, it is not even clear whether the passages in fact are incompatible; just because someone authorizes me to lie to them does not obviously provide me with a sufficient condition that necessarily triggers a certain consequence. Even on this reading, however, (D) would be more open to interpretation than (B) and require more additional assumptions; (B) in itself still would be better than (D).

Takeaways: To get these sorts of questions right, first figure out where exactly the tension is: What specifically is the point where the passages conflict? Here, it would be the question 'If a pathological liar lies to you, should you lie back to them?,' whereby passage A says 'No' and the first paragraph of passage B says 'Yes.' To resolve this apparent incompatibility, we thus have to find an answer choice that either makes passage A compatible with the idea that we should in fact lie back to the liar, or that makes the first paragraph of B compatible with the suggestion that we should not lie back to them. Answer choice (B) goes for this second option by removing the pathological liar from the scope of the argument.

For (Q16), I would anticipate the main point to be something along the lines of "Incentivized confessions can be seriously problematic because they can encourage people to give false testimony and because juries may not always detect this." (B) approximates this to a certain extent because it points towards the problematic consequences of incentivized confessions. (C) and (E) may be descriptively accurate but do not actually state the main issue that the author is trying to highlight.

(P1) PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH↓ cor. COMPUTER TECH SPREAD↑

(P2) PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH↓ cor. INDUSTRY RELIES MOST ON COMPUTER TECH

(MC) Therefore, BUSINESS COMPUTER TECH RELIANCE↑ cor. Not (PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH↑)

Weaken

There are a lot of scope shifts in this argument. At first, the author talks about the economies of industrialized countries generally, then they talk about particular industries within these economies, and the conclusion then concerns particular businesses within these industries. This points towards a possible flaw in whole-to-part reasoning: Just because industrialized economies / particular industries generally did not increase their productivity growth, this does not have to mean that the individual businesses within these economies / industries must have failed to do so as well.

The most promising answer choices are (C) and (D).

(C) is about industries that PRODUCE computer technology and increased their productivity growth. This arguably goes after premise (P2) but not the conclusion, since the conclusion talks about industries that INCREASED their reliance on computer tech. It is not clear that the producers of the tech fall within this category. The conclusion also talks about businesses, not about industries, unlike (C).

(D) is about businesses that did in fact increase their reliance on computer tech, and here we learn that within any given industry, BUSINESS COMPUTER TECH RELIANCE↑ cor. PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH↑. This has the same scope as the conclusion and goes in exactly the opposite direction.

(D) thus is better than (C) because (D) in fact talks about the same kind of thing as the conclusion of the argument, and because (D) targets this conclusion itself, rather than a premise. (C) is more open to interpretation and its scope seems woefully different from the conclusion of the argument.

Stimulus:

(P1) (TRAUMA and Not PTSD) cor. CORTISOL↑

(MC) Therefore, TRAUMA => CORTISOL↑

This argument contains a possible correlation / causation confusion. To weaken this, show that the causal connection behind the observed correlation could be different. Also notice that the conclusion overgeneralizes from the premise: The premise is only about traumatized people without PTSD, but the conclusion talks about traumatized people generally. This might be another way to weaken this argument.

(B) states: (TRAUMA and CORTISOL↑) => Not PTSD

This suggests that it might not be the trauma that is causing the increased cortisol levels. Instead, the increased cortisol causes the absence of PTSD in cases of trauma. So we are getting a case of reverse causation, which weakens the original inference from the stimulus. (B) presents us with a very clear alternative explanation of the observed correlation.

Takeaways: Look out for scope shifts between premises and conclusion, possible sampling biases, and alternative causal explanations of a given correlation.

(P1) Studies of arthritis did not find a correlation between the weather features supposedly determining arthritis pain levels and these pain levels themselves.

(P2) Arthritis patients furthermore could not identify a consistent time span between the supposed weather features determining their arthritis pain level and the actual onset of the pain.

(MC) Therefore, [MSS: if there is in fact a causal connection between certain weather features and arthritis pain levels, this connection must be somehow different from what the arthritis patients described].

MSS question; checking answer choices against this anticipated answer:

(A) The weather affects different arthritis sufferers after different time spans. Maybe, but here we are presuming that the weather in fact causally determines arthritis pain levels. For all we know, this is not guaranteed.

(B) Beliefs are causally determining arthritis pain levels. This seems unsupported by the argument; why would we get at beliefs specifically as an alternative cause? Is there a correlation between a particular weather phenomenon and temporal length? We don't know.

(C) Arthritis pain sufferers are merely imagining the correlations that they claim to exist. This is worded very strongly, but it does get at the '...if there is in fact a connection...' part of the anticipated answer. Keep this around!

(D) Some arthritis patients are more strongly affected by the weather than others. Maybe, but here we are again presuming that the patients reports are correct. For all we know, this may not be so.

(E) Scientific investigation of arthritis pain is impossible. This seems false, we know from the stimulus that there were studies.

After going through all the answer choices, (C) thus seems best because it is better than the available alternatives. Ranking: (C) > (A), (D) > (B) > (E). The strong wording definitely makes this an uncomfortable right answer choice.

Notice how the stimulus provides a hint about (C) being the correct answer though by saying 'those arthritis patients who were convinced of the existence of such a correlation.' By specifically picking out this subset of arthritis patients in this particular way, the stimulus suggests that there may also be arthritis patients who are not convinced that such a correlation exists, which in turn leads to (C).

Takeaways: Really read all individual answers attentively, and compare the available choices against each other. Select the answer choice that has the least problems.

Stimulus

(P1) SKIN CANCER RATES ↑ cor. SUNSCREEN USAGE ↑

(MC) Therefore, not (SUNSCREEN => SKIN CANCER ↓)

One way to weaken this argument would be to find an alternative explanation of how increased skin cancer rates are compatible with increased sunscreen usage. Perhaps the sunscreen is in fact effective, but the population using it somehow diverges from the population getting skin cancer? Alternatively, there could be some cause other than the sun that those affected by cancer are exposed to even though they use sunscreen.

The correct answer (B) goes for a version of the anticipated divergence, though this divergence is temporal rather than population-oriented. Here, we learn: Skin cancer takes time to come about in those who had sunburns. Even though the people NOW spending time in the sun tend to use sunscreen and thus are protected, the people spending time in the sun IN THE PAST did not do so, and thus they still keep getting cancer. We thus reconcile the increased skin cancer rates with the increased use of sunscreen in a way that does not entail that sunscreen must be ineffective; we found an alternative causal explanation of the observed correlation.

(E) says: People who use sunscreen MOST REGULARLY are also those that are (take themselves to be) most susceptible to skin cancer. But does this group also keep getting affected by cancer disproportionally? We don't know; all the stimulus tells us is that overall skin cancer rates are increasing. Moreover, this answer choice is just about people 'believing themselves to be' most susceptible, we don't in fact know whether this belief is correct.

If (E) had said: Those most susceptible to skin cancer have grown increasingly UNLIKELY to use sun screen, (E) arguably would have weakened the argument by weakening the observed correlation. Alternatively, (E) could have said that those most vulnerable to skin cancer have actually become really well protected since they started using sunscreen. Neither of these alternatives would actually have provided an alternative explanation though. We only would have weakened the argument by attacking a premise, which is a rarer weakening option in LSAT contexts.

(P1) Not SEND SPACECRAFTS

(P2) CAN COMMUNICATE -> AS INTELLIGENT

(MC) Therefore, (SENTIENT BEINGS and not AS INTELLIGENT) -> Not DETERMINE

MA: DETERMINE -> (SEND SPACECRAFTS or CAN COMMUNICATE)

(D) formulates this assumption as '(DETERMINE and Not CAN COMMUNICATE) -> SEND SPACECRAFTS'

(B) is a trap and too strong, due to the universal quantification ('any'). What if there are some sentient beings who would want to communicate with us whereas others would not? The former might in fact be willing to communicate with us, even if the latter would not.

(P1) SPANISH 101 -m-> ATTENDED ALL SESSIONS

(P2) Not ATTENDED ALL SESSIONS

MSS:

(IC) SPANISH 101 -m-> ATTENDED ALL SESSIONS -> Not <B-

Answer choice (E) approximates this anticipated conclusion more closely than (C), because 'Not <B-' means 'B- or higher.' Make sure to attentively read all answer choices and to compare them with another!

(P1) SUNLIGHT REFLECT↑ cor. ATMOSPHERE TEMPERATURE ↓

(P2) SURFACE WITH SNOW / ICE ↑ cor. SUNLIGHT REFLECT↑

(MC) Therefore, SURFACE WITH SNOW / ICE ↑ cor. ATMOSPHERE TEMPERATURE ↓

This argument is interesting in that it operates first and foremost with correlations, the causal connections are merely implied. To strengthen it, we can either (1) boost the support that the premises offer for the conclusion, (2) boost the conclusion itself, or (3) boost a premise. Anticipation seems difficult here, but presumably we could e.g. make the causal relations more explicit or just provide independent support for the conclusion.

(A) SNOW FORMATION -> ATMOSPHERE TEMPERATURE ↓. Not sure what this does, I can't see a straightforward impact that this makes on the argument.

(B) There are more factors besides snow and ice that 'affect the cooling' of the atmospheric temperature. Impact again seems unclear, I'm not even sure what 'affecting the cooling' is supposed to mean exactly (Do the factors make the atmosphere even cooler? Do they make the cooling less strong? We don't know).

(C) SURFACE WITH SNOW / ICE ↓ cor. ATMOSPHERE TEMPERATURE ↑. This reaffirms the correlation that we want to establish in the conclusion but identifies a second causal mechanism that brings this correlation about. This seems to strengthen. Not only does the correlation hold because light reflection in ice / snow cools the atmosphere but also because the absence of ice and snow in turn warms the atmosphere. The LSAT seems to be going for path (2) here, we are providing independent support for the conclusion.

(D) The atmosphere gets its heat from light passing through it. Not sure if this strengthens. It might even weaken. If the atmosphere gets its heat from light passing through it, and if snow / ice reflect more light through the atmosphere, wouldn't more snow and ice then heat the atmosphere, rather than cool it? This seems to go in the opposite direction of what we want to establish.

(E) This seems to reiterate premise (P2). Perhaps this strengthens a little bit in that it confirms that this premise really does hold, but for the most part this only seems to repeat information that we already have. By contrast, (C) actually adds something new and boosts the conclusion, rather than just repeating one of the premises.

Ranking: (C) > (E) > (A), (B) > (D)

(C) strengthens the most, (E) perhaps strengthens a little bit, (A) and (B) don't seem to have much impact, (D) arguably weakens.

There are at least two gaps in this argument that we need to bridge to establish the desired conclusion. These gaps relate to the comparability of pre-historic vs. present-day bears (do pre-historic samples accurately represent the animals from which they were taken?) and the comparability of bone vs. blood nitrogen (can we really compare the two to draw conclusions about a given animal kind's feeding habits?). The overall goal is to show that it is in fact legitimate to draw these comparisons, and to thus bolster the conclusion that pre-historic bears' nitrogen levels indicate that they eat meat.

(A) This is about plants, does not address the gaps in the argument or its overall topic.

(B) This is about nitrogen rates (as opposed to levels), and about herbivores. Out of scope, does not address the gaps in the argument.

(C) This is about the numbers of samples taken and thus again misses the gaps in the argument.

(D) Best available answer, establishes that blood and bone samples are comparable.

(E) 'With respect to their nitrogen levels, you can compare the bones of any two meat-eating bears with another.' Unhelpful, we are trying to compare blood nitrogen and bone nitrogen, and we don't know for sure whether the pre-historic bears were in fact carnivores.

Answer choice ranking: (D) > (E) > (A), (B), (C)

Consider paragraph three: The Third Period is supposed to be characterized by "wild and extreme rhetoric" and the envisioning of a "new world." (B) fits much better than (C) here, due to "final global victory over capitalist oppression."

In (Q17), there might be a distinction at play between 'The economists' overall conclusion is false' and 'The economists' argument for their conclusion is flawed.' (A) seems to get at the second option, (B) at the first one. The author does not take themselves to have established that it is legitimate to wage moral criticisms at corporations (= falsifying the conclusion), the author merely claims that the economists' rejection of this claim is poorly supported.

This argument seems too idiosyncratic (incoherent?) to formalize it. The crucial thing to notice are that there are some term shift ('sells well' and 'popular,' 'written to give pleasure' and 'gives pleasure,' 'impart the truth' and 'being partially untrue'), which the author simply seems to gloss over. Moreover, there is only one answer choice that directly addresses one of these term shifts, so process of elimination is most likely the way to go here and probably the most realistic option to get this question right.

(P1) Often, there is only one kind of bodily structure that will allow a given animal type to satisfy a given need.

(P2) Moreover, different animal types often have similar needs.

(IC) Therefore, [...].

(MC) Therefore, it is unsurprising that different animal types often have similar bodily structures.

(IC) is most plausibly interpreted as 'Therefore, different animal types will often address their needs in similar ways.'

(B) approximates this more closely than (C), which lacks the idea of similarity and is formulated in stronger language.

(B) > (C) > (A), (D), (E)

Stimulus:

(P1) COFFEE HOUSE -> P. PLACE

(P2) RESTAURANTS -> P. PLACE

(P3) (P. PLACE and WELL-DESIGNED) -m-> ARTWORK

(P4) (P. PLACE and WELL-DESIGNED -> COMFORTABLE -> SP. INTERIOR)

(A) (RESTAURANT ans SP. INTERIOR) -> COMFORTABLE. Does not follow.

(B) (P. PLACE and ARTWORK) -> WELL_DESIGNED. Does not follow

(C) (COFFEE HOUSE and WELL-DESIGNED) -m-> ARTWORK. Illicitly transfers a 'most' statement from '(WELL-DESIGNED and P. PLACE)' to a sub-category of (WELL-DESIGNED and P. PLACE).

(D) (COFFEEHOUSE and WELL-DESIGNED) -> SP. INTERIOR. Follows from (P1) and (P4).

(E) (COFFEE HOUSE and SP. INTERIOR) -> (P.PLACE and WELL-DESIGNED). Does not follow.

Takeaways: Be careful with 'most' statements. Don't confuse 'A -m-> B -> C; therefore, A -m-> C' (valid!) with 'A -> B -m-> C; therefore A -m-> C' (invalid!).