Is the only reason C is wrong bc this one instance doesn't give enough context to surmise that we shouldn't "never" do anything?

How do I reconcile this w the fact that NA questions move support from ACs to Stimulus? If the necessary assumption is that something should never be done, would that not totally satisfy the needs of a singular instance where that should also not be done? Is it the "never" combined with the fact that there was a more suitable answer there too?

#help How does the concept of something's funding being warranted justify it's outcomes not being unjust?

The "warrant" given here to fund the arts is merely a description of the legal process ("within their rights"), I don't see how it being legal necessarily impacts whether the treatment of the tax payers is or is not unjust. (ie: something can be legal, but not right, and vice-versa)

Ahh, I see. Thank you. I guess my error came down to reading comprehension then, as I understood a definition being "internally contradictory" as being one that would cause a contradiction within the internal bounds of argument, rather than in the definition itself.

I suppose my confusion stems from the pre-existing recognition that the argument itself is flawed.

Both E and A are in agreement that the author is not right to suggest that "humans are not rational" on the basis of the behavior they cite alone. I suppose the "textual hook" here would be that the behavior they cite does not preclude being "rational" in one sense of the term, but does in fact preclude being "rational" in the other sense of the term. The author doesn't state that humans aren't rational on the basis of their failing to be rational, but instead bc of their doing something they explicitly feel is NOT rational.

Damaging the environment doesn't have any bearing at all on humans' "capacity for well-considered thinking and behavior." But it does have a distinctly pronounced impact on humans' tendency to behave in a manner that "makes sense with regard to reason/logic."

Given that the argument is flawed, either the author is misunderstanding what it means to actually possess the quality they've defined (as I guess is the case) or they're simply using the term in two separate ways (a possibility which is also offered to us and is seemingly possible given the two uses of the term in context).

It makes sense to accept the definition present in the stimulus, but allowing for only that definition eventually leads to the logical fallacy / error in argumentation we're analyzing. Whether this error is resolved more fully by the recognition that the author isn't obeying their own definition, or that the author could just as easily be illicitly engaging 2 definitions of the same word is immensely confusing and frustratingly abstract, especially given there is no "MOST flawed" in the question phrasing.

#help

Is it not completely absurd to assume that a higher yield of meat and milk per cow in a market experiencing an increasing demand for meat and milk would result in a decrease in the (growth of the) cow population??

What industry is so selfless and eco-friendly? Why does NEEDING less cows have any bearing whatsoever on the actual number of cows present? What industry (or even rational human agents) limits their capacity to earn to exactly what is needed? We are literally told explicitly that the cow population has grown to MEET a demand that presumably outpaces it in growth. There is a stated disparity between these two quantities that could more than logically be resolved through the continuation of the "more cows" strategy.

Is it not infinitely more feasible to suggest that as a result of the increase in yield, the cow farming industry would make more money per cow and perhaps even introduce more cows to raise their income and thereby perhaps even INCREASE the amount of methane??

What am I missing here?

#help

Doesn't "The Eagles have lost only when Jennifer was not playing" still absolutely allow for the possibility of their winning, even without Jennifer playing? The stimulus states that her absence is correlated with losing, but it makes no statement on the circumstances needed for winning.

How is it sound to take [Lose]→[Jennifer] to, in practice, mean [Jennifer]→[Lose]. (Like, these are not actual causal relationships that function in this logical way? They're observed correlations, the whole point of which being that they're not entirely sound)

The "occurrences that have coincided" are not wins, they are loses, the stimulus makes no indication about the occurrence of wins. It rly doesn't feel like this AC connects directly to the Conclusion in that way.

(Not to be semantic, but "not losing" could just as easily mean tying a game, or missing it altogether)

#help

Uhh, does the use of the term "rational" here not indeed illicitly encompass 2 meanings? Those being "possessing the capacity for thoughtful behavior" [rationality], and "making sense with regards to existing information/logic" [rational]?

"Doing something that the author doesn't feel makes sense" absolutely does not mean that humans don't/can't possess a capacity they are known to have, it CAN however, be used as an indication that certain behaviors are illogical or "not in accordance with reason." It's 2 completely separate uses of that adjective (corroborated by Oxford dictionary).

To say "I will only have conversations with rational people" and "It's not rational to wake up so early" are not using this term in an identical manner. Perhaps the admittedly subtle difference doesn't completely dismantle this argument, but I don't see how that could still not be the case. (This discrepancy does affect the argument as well fwiw, the conclusion literally states something that is distinct and not fully supported on the basis of previous statements). What am I missing here?

read "incomplete" instead of "incorrect" on 16.... FML!

Most clutch guess of my entire life. I've never spent so much time agonizing over a question I got right

#help

Does the stimulus not strongly indicate that between cats and allergy sufferers, the one that determines whether or not there will be an allergic reaction is in no small part the human ("varies from allergy sufferer to allergy sufferer")?

Cats are one domesticated animal species. I do not understand how, in the text, it is suggested that the variance of allergic reactions depends on their secretions of fundamentally different substances, rather than a human's variance in susceptibility to those substances?

Humans are far more advanced and complex organisms. And while I understand that this is technically outside context that is not permitted to influence my choices, there is a commonly understood notion of human beings having differently tuned allergies to different substances (in different quantities as well).

Something I have NOT ever encountered, is the concept that animals within the same genus/species/order (whatever) could have drastically different skin proteins or saliva??

How is it not equally possible, given the stimulus, that the variance of reactions is mostly dependent on the humans??

(ie: if cats secrete allergens A-Z, and a single human, despite all their other allergies, is immune to allergen Q, then every similar cat will eventually fail to trigger a reaction in a human whose configuration of allergy immunities is allergen Q. They will indeed "fail to cause an allergic reaction in all types of allergy sufferers." The stimulus expressly states that this is both possible, and common!!)

Beyond the fact that "allergy sufferers" could include people allergic to shellfish and peanut butter (as the term "particular individual" encompasses non-allergic people in AC A), I need some extra help understanding why B is incorrect. What did I miss here?

Regarding Q6: Where exactly in the text does it establish that ALL despedidas follow the same convention? I sorta understood the deconstruction in the text to be representative of just one of those repeating verses (of potentially many)

How does the act of saving the teeth even slightly imply or support the idea that Neanderthals weren't nomadic? We already know the teeth were discarded from the stimulus, the fact of their being saved for religious rituals neither directly nor indirectly confirms their being sourced from various locations.

AC C can just as easily suppose a narrative wherein the Neanderthals ARENT nomadic and simply saved the teeth year-round for their ritual.

Regarding AC B:

How is it not the case that if "economies of most regions of natural beauty ARE based primarily on local industries that would be harmed by governmentally mandated environmental protection," that the implementation of those protections could still "help the economy overall?"

To be "based primarily on" something typically indicates that it is the prime factor on which the element hinges. Sure the stimulus only says "some will be harmed," which is why I recognize E is correct. But for there to be help overall despite the harm, is it not necessary to assert that the aspect being harmed is not in fact the most consequential aspect on which everything else is based (harm to which would limit the "help" from being "overall?")

Even if the environmental protections invite more new businesses, if the businesses that the economy is primarily based on are being harmed, I find it hard to believe that the economy is being overall helped? That would require some pretty fantastical numbers that seem somewhat illicit to assume here?

Is the trick to getting this right the understanding that the disparate elements that need "resolution" here are actually [prevention vs. illegality] and not [cigarettes vs. fatty foods]

Is this a case wherein "Most" does not have the potential to equal "All?"

When is or is that not the case?

It feels a little silly / dishonest for the fact that 9 y/os not being of legal age to smoke is the key attribute of the argument here, given the fact that the argument bothers to include that a non-zero number of 9 y/os in the experiment DO smoke!

We should just somehow know to assume that the law / societal norms are the ultimate deciding factor in the behavior of all of these children, except for some reason those for whom it isnt? Why wouldn't all the 9 y/os who would smoke were they to be 19 just do whatever that "<1%" does?

Does the inclusion of the fact that some children do in fact smoke not strongly rhetorically suggest that the option / possibility of children smoking does somehow exist, and therefore the fact that most do not is ultimately a matter of choice rather than the impossibility of it?

#help

could someone please elaborate on why the average timeframe between strikes can't be used as a means to reasonably predict the next one given the fact that nearly the entire allotted time has gone by? The argument doesn't really go as far as to say what WILL occur, rather just what people should expect, which seems like it would have a much different barrier of reasonability.

I recognize that "An average of once every 100 million years" doesn't mean they occur exactly every 100 million years, but rather that the incidences of this phenomenon average out to that. They could happen twice within a 50 million year timeframe and then not again for another 200 million years (or something like that).

But does 100 million years (the recorded average between strikes) having passed since the last incidence not (at least unscientifically, perhaps) suggest an increased likelihood of one happening in the future? For every day a meteor doesn't strike, the probability of it occurring the following day should theoretically increase, bc there are only so many days in existence on which events can occur.

Am I totally misunderstanding probability here?

That makes sense. And also seems like a fair assessment of the faults in my "LSAT psychology."

Can you share any advice on how to train myself out of the "coherent narrative" instinct? As I think it's probably cost me points before in similar scenarios.

It seems as though sometimes, assuming the facts are meant to exist within a rational context spells disaster. Other times, (even questions on this exact PT) require extrapolations of outside content that would (for the purposes of this question) seem entirely illicit and would violate this exact principle.

Does it have to do with question type? Whether the information is present in AC or stimulus??

Thank you for the response. I realize the same general assembly cannot start at 2 different times, but the question seems to read as though protocol for a day having 2 quorums is merely an ancillary detail for which we're not meant to make any extraneous assumptions.

For example, if either of the quorum sentences stated "if x quorum, then GA can ONLY/MUST be y time," the fact of their being mutually exclusive would be evident. As it is now though, the stimulus reads as though the GA start time is merely a consequence of the quorum length, rather than a matter of prescribed rules/policies.

It's obviously completely illicit to assume that each quroum is only 1 hour. However, if we do so (same as we might to assume that the general assembly is never permitted to occur on a day with 2 quorums) it then becomes entirely possible for both to be held within one night.

What lesson should I be taking away from this? What should I have seized on in the stimulus to more fully understand the restrictions placed on the possibilities here?

Why would it be the case that what is true of MOST people strengthens / affects an argument where the domain has already been set to affect only people with specific needs?

#help

How does the similarity between Caligula's reported actions and previous recorded actions suggest more strongly that the reports were fabricated than that Caligula's acts of cruelty were just derivative?

(to address points mentioned in the explanation: an event occurring after another identical event need not be "merely coincidence," the possibility of which admittedly is somewhat farfetched. It would make complete sense to me to suppose that a cruel leader was inspired by previous cruel behaviors and elected therefore to enact them in the same way.

Also, AC C does not say the acts were "exactly the same," it says they are merely "very similar," which creates a HUGE chasm of proof between being similar, which could very plausibly occur, and being 100% identical, which I admit would raise some academic suspicion.

However, even the term "earlier writings" raises eyebrows imo. Nothing at all suggests these are scholarly texts, or even the "histories" referenced in the stimulus. If the accounts of said cruelty had been, instead, a letter between citizens, or a work for public consumption, the notion referenced in the explanation that this information was far too arcane and obscure for Caligula to ever be aware of seems to fall apart. Caligula was a political leader, I don't see it as a "stretch" to suggest that he would be reasonably informed about the notable actions of previous political leaders.)

#help Can someone pls explain further how we are meant to reach the assumption that the quorums cannot both be held on the same night?

I read the stimulus to mean "If ONLY x occurs, then y." I realize now that his was a flawed reading that prevented me from arriving at the correct answer, but what textual indication really is there that the events can't both happen? (there is no "must" or "always" to imply that these rules are entirely inflexible, nor is there any indication of when the GA would start if there were no quorum).

It seems like there was a lot of relevant and impactful information missing here, and some of it we're simply meant to assume, while the rest is hand-waved as being irrelevant. What am I missing?

Are we really supposed to take "a hit song is played thousands of times" to mean ALL hit songs are played thousands of times? I feel like thats the element this question hinges on but I can't help but feel that's slightly "un-LSAT."

The stimulus certainly suggests playing thousands of time is SUFFICIENT for being a hit, but I cant find any phrasing that would suggest it's also NECESSARY.

In fact, the stimulus even goes as far as to muddy the waters and add in the fact that certain songwriters AREN'T paid radio rates for hits, suggesting (perhaps incorrectly) that hits made for movies may not even play on the radio.

I absolutely see how ac C COULD be true. But I'm having a very hard time figuring out (aside from poe) what in the stimulus makes it so it MUST be true?

#help

Can someone please expand more on the relationship here between the concepts of (dis)satisfaction in the AC and "accuracy in reflection of opinion" in the stimulus?

Even if it were the case that "in general" one type of student were more inclined to participate in reviews than another (assuming school faculty know how many students are present in the student body) a result that skews dramatically between satisfied and dissatisfied students would still accurately reflect the distribution of student opinion.

In theory, the reflection can only become "inaccurate" once enough people have abstained from participating that the total number of participants no longer accurately reflects the student body. But the AC doesn't say a certain type of student is more likely than another to abstain from the evaluations, only the likelihood of their participation.

DS students being more likely than S students to participate DOES NOT mean that one group is not participating in quantities that are meaningful. It merely allows for the possibility of 9/10 students from one group participating and 8/10 of the other participating, which (regardless of the size dynamics between the groups) would likely still result in an accurate reflection of student opinion. Maybe if the stimulus phrasing were "exactly/perfectly accurate" I'd understand. But as things are, I'm left confused.

What am I missing here?

Does this question really just ultimately hinge on the conclusion stating "Bacons view ON OPTICS" should be disregarded, rather than "Bacons view on authority/experimentation?"

Since drawing a conclusion based on dissonance between stated positions and behaviors hardly constitutes "criticizing character." I see how an implicit presumption here would be that those whose actions do not mirror their positions are untrustworthy or not well-informed, but that's really not referred to at all in the stimulus aside from the referent subject in the conclusion not being what was evaluated in the previous premises.

However, I feel the rejection of Bacon being made here is almost entirely divorced from critique of his character. Does LSAT consider ALL considerations of someones personal life / history / professional work as something that inexorably pertains to their "character"???

(ie: Would a doctor who has committed malpractice being distrusted in another context be considered "ad-hominem" on the LSAT? Or is there a more holistic recognition of the idea that all elements of our lives at least partially pertain to our knowledge in unrelated endeavors)