Actual Answer 2

In determining whether the defendant, Harold Gunton, will be found guilty of the first-degree felony charge of knowingly possessing any quantity of methamphetamine, and of the first-degree misdemeanor charge of possessing more than one ounce of methamphetamine, both common-law doctrine and the model penal code prove to be instructive. Of the first charge, Gunton's lack of culpabilty will be determined via a failure to meet the standards required by the mens rea element of "knowledge," specifically stated in Southlandia code § 716. The merits in this particular case prove that this element of "knowledge" has not been sufficiently met. A discussion of "wilful blindness" (as described in common law doctrine), which is a distinct state of mind, and is not a viable substitution for actual "knowledge," when the statue distinctly requires such knowledge, is the basis for Gunton's lack of culpability. Of the latter charge, considering whether Gunton had in his possession more than one ounce of methamphetamine, the matter of fact can be determined with greater ease, the defendant will proven to be guilty of such charge as this element has been sufficiently met.

The legal rule of wilful blindness, which is derived from common law's one strict exception for failing to meet the threshold of actual "knowledge" has been summed up as follows: One who is suspicious of illegal activity but shuts their eyes to such activity, and fails to ensure their suspicion is correct in a deliberate attempt to remain ignorant. In this case, according to common law, such individual can be deemed to have had knowledge and are thus culpable for such illegal crime. Thus, the "high probability" justification, that is, the belief that the mens rea of wilful ignorance is present and the defendant is almost certain of wrongdoing, is what may be used to convict such defendant. However, The Model Penal code restricts the basis for which this strict exception can be said to apply, and considering the merits of Gunton's case offer a better fit for understanding lack of culpability. The Model Penal Code instructs us [[S]ection 2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code; US v. Jewell] that when actual knowledge of possesion of drugs is an element of the offense, the defendant has to be aware of a high probability of his own possession of said drugs, unless he does not believe he does not have possesion at all. This latter rule is what must be applied in this context, not the strict exception rule.

Defendant Gunton testifies that he did not have actual positive knowledge that he possessed illegal drugs (Meth), but that he actually believed he possessed guns. These guns given to him by Jones, who is an illegal arms dealer, could be reasonably deduced to be illegal. Either way, Gunton was not certain, because he did not open the briefcase that he was given. In deciphering Gunton's mens rea, not only is positive knowledge lacking, but so is an awareness of high probability that Gunton possessed these drugs. He thought he possessed guns, and drugs weren't even on his radar of possibilities within that suitcase! Gunton did not believe Jones to be associated with drugs, neither had he seen drugs in the briefcase, and there is no evidence presented that Gunton would have made a reasonable jump to assume he, himself, in his vehicle possessed 12 ounces of methamphetamine. It can be said, according to his testimony, that he does not believe he had in his possession at all any methamphetamine. According to The Model Penal Code, because defendant Gunton did not possess the mens rea of wilful ignorance (at least not for illegal drugs), and because he did not actually know, or believe without a reasonable doubt that he had in his possession any illegal drugs (including meth), he cannot be said to have met the "high probability" justification for culpability for the first-degree felony charge.

In regards to the latter charge, defendant Gunton was the owner and sole driver of the aforementioned truck during the transport of the illegal substance, as he traveled across state for his work responsibilities. In addition, Gunton had in his possession a closed briefcase, which he was given, and agreed to take. While he states that he believed the briefcase to contain guns and not drugs, this is irrelevant to proving the element of possession, for which Gunton clearly had in his vehicle and thus in his possession. It is irrelevant whether he saw the drugs, only that he had them in his care. The action was achieved and that's what matters here in determining his guilt in the misdemeanor "possession" charge, for which he is guilty.

In conclusion, I have shown that Gunton cannot be said to have met either the element of "actual knowledge" required by the statue or what common law substitutes as "wilful ignorance." For in keeping mind The Model Penal Code which restricts such strict exception, we see that defendant Gunton does not meet even the "high probability" justification for culpability in this case. Therefore, I affirm, that Gunton should not be found guilty of the first-degree felony charge. In regards to the first-degree misdmeanor charge, the element of possession has been established with certainty and according to the statue, Gunton should be found guilty.

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