This is a Principle question.

We are to extract from this argument by analogy the underlying principle. The right answer states the principle, and the argument in the stimulus is an application of that principle.

The argument contains a premise about SUV drivers and a conclusion about cancer and smoking. It’s an argument by analogy. In order for the reasoning by analogy to run through, both the premise and conclusion have to conform to some underlying principle. Otherwise, what happens with drivers and SUVs would have little bearing on cures for cancer and behaviors like smoking.

The premise says that drivers of SUVs have the correct belief that because they're in an SUV, they're better protected. They have lower risk of serious injury. As a result, their behavior changes. Because they know they’re safer, they start to drive more recklessly. They know the negative consequences are not as bad, so they start to take on more risk.

The conclusion says that the discovery of powerful cures for certain high-incidence forms of cancer would probably trigger an increase in behaviors such as smoking and overexposure to sun that are known to increase the risk of such cancers. If we have a cure for lung cancer, then more people would smoke more. If we have a cure for skin cancer, then more people would overexpose themselves to UV light.

Is this analogous to what was described in the premise? Yes, because there is an underlying principle at work here: mitigating or eliminating the negative consequences of an action invites increased participation in that action. Another way to state that is if the risk of harm is decreased, then people will engage more in that form of risky behavior. This unifying principle is what ties together these two totally different situations. It’s how this argument’s reasoning by analogy runs through.

Answer Choice (A) says when people believe that there are several measures they could take to reduce the risk associated with a certain activity, generally they will only take the measure that they believe will most reduce that risk. That’s not the principle at work here.

For the argument to conform to this principle, we’d have to show several measures to reduce the risk associated with driving and then have the driver pick the most effective one. So maybe one measure is to get into an SUV. A second measure is to put on your seatbelt. A third measure is to have airbags. The fourth measure is don't run red lights. According to (A), the principle here is that you assign some probability to each measure and then pick the measure that will most reduce the risk associated with driving.

Correct Answer Choice (B) says the development of ways to protect people from the consequences of behavior that would normally harm them often makes people less careful to avoid such behaviors.

Yes, that’s the principle. “Behaviors that would normally harm them.” What kind of behavior are we talking about here? If applied to driving, then we’re talking about reckless driving. That's behavior that normally would harm you. “The development of ways to protect you from the consequences of reckless driving” is putting you in an SUV. Because when you're in an SUV, it lowers the risk of serious injury as a result of accidents. And as a result, you are less careful to avoid reckless driving.

It’s the same in the conclusion. The behavior that normally would harm people is, say, smoking. If we develop ways to protect people from the consequences of smoking, i.e., lung cancer, then that's going to make people smoke more.

(B) is correct because it extracts the underlying principle that analogizes these two seemingly different situations.

Answer Choice (C) says that people generally take special care to avoid behaviors that they believe would likely lead to serious harm and generally do not take special care to avoid behaviors that they believe will not harm them at all. That’s not the principle at work here.

What behaviors would likely lead to serious harm that people are avoiding? Reckless driving? But if that's the behavior, there's no indication that people are taking special care to avoid reckless driving. What behaviors won't cause harm? The argument doesn’t say. (C) has a hard time mapping onto the argument.

We could make up an argument for (C) to map onto. In general, when traffic lights turn red, everybody stops. When the lights turn green, everybody goes.

This maps onto (C). People are taking special care to avoid behaviors (running a red light) that they believe will likely lead to serious injury. People are not taking special care to avoid behavior that they believe will not harm them (running a green light). In other words, people run green lights.

Answer Choice (D) says people generally exercise more care when performing activities that they know to have risky consequences than when performing activities of unknown risk. That’s not the principle at work here.

To illustrate the principle in (D), consider two activities. Activity one you know is risky. Activity two has a risk profile that’s unknown to you. It could be just as risky, less risky, or more risky than activity one. (D) is saying that people are more careful when performing activity one. This doesn’t map onto the argument.

Moreover, I'm not sure this is a reasonable attitude. If you don't even know the risk profile associated with an activity, wouldn't it be prudent to be extra careful just in case?

Answer Choice (E) says avoiding serious harm to themselves is given a high priority by people in their behavior but avoiding lesser harm is frequently outweighed by various desires. That’s not the principle at work here.

To illustrate the principle in (E), consider the serious harm of losing your arm. You’re going to be very careful to avoid that kind of harm. Now consider the less serious harm of getting a bruise. People regularly choose to risk getting bruised because they have other desires that are more important to them. For example, if you go hiking, you might get bruised. If you play basketball, you might get bruised. The desire to go hiking or play basketball often outweighs the lesser harm of getting a bruise.

If applied to driving, then avoiding serious harm is given a high priority by people in their behavior. That’s why people don’t run red lights. But avoiding less harm is frequently outweighed by various other desires like wanting to get to a destination faster. That’s why people speed. Speeding is not as serious as running a red light, but it does increase your chances of getting hurt (and hurting others).


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This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.

The argument contains one premise and one conclusion. The premise is that last year and the year before, Browning (a town, presumably) experienced significantly more rainfall in September than in July. The conclusion is predictive. It predicts that this year, Browning will probably also experience more rain in September than in July.

This is a terrible argument and you intuitively understand why. Two instances is not enough data to establish a pattern when it comes to rainfall. Imagine if this argument had a premise that said, “Meteorological records indicate that over the past two hundred years, Browning experienced significantly more rainfall in September than in July.” Well, now we’re talking. This is a pattern and it supports a prediction that this year, Browning will probably also experience more rain in September than in July. At least that would be the default reasonable position and the burden would be on the person claiming this year to be an exception to provide the evidence. Why? Because when it comes to rainfall patterns, two data points isn’t enough and two hundred is. Where is the line between enough and not enough? Is 30 data points enough? What about ten? I don’t know, ask a meteorologist. But you and I both know that two isn’t and two hundred is.

The flawed method of reasoning in this argument is recurring. This is a type of analogy flaw. The argument tries to draw a conclusion about the future based on information about the past. The central assumption is that the future is relevantly similar to the past. That assumption may be true or it may be false. It all depends on what specifically we’re talking about in the premises and the conclusion. Here, in this premise, we have past information that is scant. And so the conclusion about the future is poorly supported.

Correct Answer Choice (B) points this out. It says the argument is weak because it draws an inference about a future event on the basis of a very limited number of instances of related past events. That’s it.

Answer Choice (A) says that the argument contains a premise that presupposed the truth of the conclusion. This is a charge of circular reasoning, of begging the question. This is descriptively inaccurate. The premise is a description of past events. The conclusion is a prediction of a future event. The premise (about what already happened) does not presuppose the conclusion (about what likely will happen) to be true. Here’s a circular argument guilty of the charge in (A): Last year and the year before, Browning experienced significantly more rainfall in September than in July. Therefore, in the past two years, Browning experienced significantly less rainfall in July than in September.

Answer Choice (C) says that the argument overemphasizes the possibility that average rainfall statistics could be skewed by large rainfall in one year. What? “Overemphasizes”? But that possibility wasn’t even present in the argument. (C) is descriptively inaccurate.

Answer Choice (D) says that the argument concludes that “two phenomena are associated.” Hold up. Is that an accurate description of the conclusion? The most charitable reading of the conclusion to accommodate (D) would be to interpret one phenomenon as amount of rain and the other phenomenon as time, namely what month it is, namely whether it’s September or July. Stretching the bounds of reasonable interpretation, we can map (D)’s description of the conclusion onto the actual conclusion. That the amount of rainfall is associated with whether it’s September or July. Okay, fine. Let’s check out (D)’s premise descriptor. Merely from the claim that there are “many instances in which both phenomena are present.” Uh, no. Our interpretation is broken. Many instances? The premise contains two instances. Last year and the year before. Last year, “both phenomena were present”? What does that even mean? Last year there was rain and there was September/July? See, that makes no sense.

Answer Choice (E) says that the argument uses evidence drawn from a source whose reliability cannot readily be verified. No, that’s not descriptively accurate. We have no idea where the historical data came from. We therefore have no idea if that source’s reliability can or cannot be readily verified.


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This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.

The argument contains one premise and one conclusion. The premise is that last year and the year before, Browning (a town, presumably) experienced significantly more rainfall in September than in July. The conclusion is predictive. It predicts that this year, Browning will probably also experience more rain in September than in July.

This is a terrible argument and you intuitively understand why. Two instances is not enough data to establish a pattern when it comes to rainfall. Imagine if this argument had a premise that said, “Meteorological records indicate that over the past two hundred years, Browning experienced significantly more rainfall in September than in July.” Well, now we’re talking. This is a pattern and it supports a prediction that this year, Browning will probably also experience more rain in September than in July. At least that would be the default reasonable position and the burden would be on the person claiming this year to be an exception to provide the evidence. Why? Because when it comes to rainfall patterns, two data points isn’t enough and two hundred is. Where is the line between enough and not enough? Is 30 data points enough? What about ten? I don’t know, ask a meteorologist. But you and I both know that two isn’t and two hundred is.

The flawed method of reasoning in this argument is recurring. This is a type of analogy flaw. The argument tries to draw a conclusion about the future based on information about the past. The central assumption is that the future is relevantly similar to the past. That assumption may be true or it may be false. It all depends on what specifically we’re talking about in the premises and the conclusion. Here, in this premise, we have past information that is scant. And so the conclusion about the future is poorly supported.

Correct Answer Choice (B) points this out. It says the argument is weak because it draws an inference about a future event on the basis of a very limited number of instances of related past events. That’s it.

Answer Choice (A) says that the argument contains a premise that presupposed the truth of the conclusion. This is a charge of circular reasoning, of begging the question. This is descriptively inaccurate. The premise is a description of past events. The conclusion is a prediction of a future event. The premise (about what already happened) does not presuppose the conclusion (about what likely will happen) to be true. Here’s a circular argument guilty of the charge in (A): Last year and the year before, Browning experienced significantly more rainfall in September than in July. Therefore, in the past two years, Browning experienced significantly less rainfall in July than in September.

Answer Choice (C) says that the argument overemphasizes the possibility that average rainfall statistics could be skewed by large rainfall in one year. What? “Overemphasizes”? But that possibility wasn’t even present in the argument. (C) is descriptively inaccurate.

Answer Choice (D) says that the argument concludes that “two phenomena are associated.” Hold up. Is that an accurate description of the conclusion? The most charitable reading of the conclusion to accommodate (D) would be to interpret one phenomenon as amount of rain and the other phenomenon as time, namely what month it is, namely whether it’s September or July. Stretching the bounds of reasonable interpretation, we can map (D)’s description of the conclusion onto the actual conclusion. That the amount of rainfall is associated with whether it’s September or July. Okay, fine. Let’s check out (D)’s premise descriptor. Merely from the claim that there are “many instances in which both phenomena are present.” Uh, no. Our interpretation is broken. Many instances? The premise contains two instances. Last year and the year before. Last year, “both phenomena were present”? What does that even mean? Last year there was rain and there was September/July? See, that makes no sense.

Answer Choice (E) says that the argument uses evidence drawn from a source whose reliability cannot readily be verified. No, that’s not descriptively accurate. We have no idea where the historical data came from. We therefore have no idea if that source’s reliability can or cannot be readily verified.


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This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.

The student claims that his paper was not graded in accordance with the professor’s stated criteria. That sounds like the conclusion. Okay, why not? What did the professor say the criteria would be? She said that she’d give As only to papers whose conclusions were supported by reliable statistical evidence. That’s a conditional. A → rse. His paper’s conclusion was supported by rse yet he got a B.

I don’t see what the problem is here. His paper met a necessary condition for getting an A. But he’s complaining that he only got a B? Oh, he must be confused about sufficient and necessary conditions. He thought rse → A. That’s why he thinks the professor should have given him an A.

This is the oldest mistake in the book. Correct Answer Choice (C) points it out. He takes a condition that is among the requirements (necessary) for a particular grade to be a condition that is enough to guarantee (sufficient) that grade.

Answer Choice (A) says the argument discusses the prof’s criteria as a distraction. But that’s descriptively inaccurate. The argument discusses the prof’s criteria in order to apply it to the case at hand, not to call attention away from anything.

Answer Choice (B) says the argument committed the descriptive premise to prescriptive conclusion flaw. That’s not what the argument does. The argument’s conclusion and premises are all descriptive.

Answer Choice (D) says the argument is based on the report of a biased participant in the controversy. Yes, this is descriptively accurate. The student is reporting the facts to us, facts about what the stated criteria was and facts about his paper. He is presumably biased. But so what? It’s not because of his bias that this argument is weak. His argument is weak because of a logical error.

Answer Choice (E) says the argument conflated the professor’s grading criteria with the objective criteria of a paper’s quality. What does this mean? (E) claims that there are two different criteria. There’s the professor’s criteria for grading (A only if rse). Then there’s the objective criteria for quality. What is it? (E) doesn’t say but presumably it’s different from the prof’s criteria. But there’s just one criteria. It’s not like the student argued that his paper met the prof’s criteria and therefore must be an objectively high-quality paper.


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This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.

The student claims that his paper was not graded in accordance with the professor’s stated criteria. That sounds like the conclusion. Okay, why not? What did the professor say the criteria would be? She said that she’d give As only to papers whose conclusions were supported by reliable statistical evidence. That’s a conditional. A → rse. His paper’s conclusion was supported by rse yet he got a B.

I don’t see what the problem is here. His paper met a necessary condition for getting an A. But he’s complaining that he only got a B? Oh, he must be confused about sufficient and necessary conditions. He thought rse → A. That’s why he thinks the professor should have given him an A.

This is the oldest mistake in the book. Correct Answer Choice (C) points it out. He takes a condition that is among the requirements (necessary) for a particular grade to be a condition that is enough to guarantee (sufficient) that grade.

Answer Choice (A) says the argument discusses the prof’s criteria as a distraction. But that’s descriptively inaccurate. The argument discusses the prof’s criteria in order to apply it to the case at hand, not to call attention away from anything.

Answer Choice (B) says the argument committed the descriptive premise to prescriptive conclusion flaw. That’s not what the argument does. The argument’s conclusion and premises are all descriptive.

Answer Choice (D) says the argument is based on the report of a biased participant in the controversy. Yes, this is descriptively accurate. The student is reporting the facts to us, facts about what the stated criteria was and facts about his paper. He is presumably biased. But so what? It’s not because of his bias that this argument is weak. His argument is weak because of a logical error.

Answer Choice (E) says the argument conflated the professor’s grading criteria with the objective criteria of a paper’s quality. What does this mean? (E) claims that there are two different criteria. There’s the professor’s criteria for grading (A only if rse). Then there’s the objective criteria for quality. What is it? (E) doesn’t say but presumably it’s different from the prof’s criteria. But there’s just one criteria. It’s not like the student argued that his paper met the prof’s criteria and therefore must be an objectively high-quality paper.


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This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.

The argument opens with a general principle. Generally, it’s important that people practice what they preach but there are exceptions. The next sentence opens with “For instance…” which means we’re about to get premises. The argument is saying, “Let me show you instances of the exceptions, in case you don’t believe me.”

Okay, so what are the “instances”? Doctors don’t have to have healthy lifestyles in order to treat people. So that’s an instance. Also, logicians don’t have to be logical in their discussion of logic.

Had the argument simply been presented like that, then where we would question the reasoning would be on the two supposed instances “exceptions.” We could argue whether doctors are an exception to the rule or if they actually fit into the rule. We might argue that, actually, it's important for doctors to practice what they preach for whatever reason. This is what Answer Choice (B) tries to argue. And then we’d try to do the same for logicians. Do they fit the rule or fit the exception?

But the actual argument isn't just "For instance, doctors are an exception and logicians are an exception." The actual argument analogizes logicians to doctors. In so doing, the question of whether either fits the rule or the exception becomes entangled. They are no longer separate analyses.

The actual argument pegs whether logicians must practice what they preach to whether doctors must practice what they preach, as if answering the question for doctors reveals some information that answers the question for logicians. That is the crucial assumption at play.

  • Assumption: With regard to whether it's important to practice what you preach, doctors and logicians are analogous.
  • Premise: Doctors don’t need to have healthy lifestyles to treat people.
  • Sub-conclusion: Logicians don’t have to be logical to discuss logic.

That assumption is fallacious because doctors and logicians are not analogous in that regard. This is what Correct Answer Choice (A) points out. If a doctor doesn’t practice what she preaches, then she can still effectively do her job of being a doctor: treat people. If a logician doesn’t practice what she preaches, then she can no longer do her job of being a logician: logically discuss logic. One can even question to what extent an illogical logician can even be considered a logician. Yet a doctor with an unhealthy lifestyle is no less a doctor. (A) points this out. It says that the argument is weak because it failed to take into account that logicians’ being illogical constitutes incompetence whereas physicians’ having unhealthy lifestyles doesn’t. This is where the two situations are relevantly dissimilar.

Answer Choice (B) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that if a physician’s health deteriorates badly, the physician may not be able to treat patients effectively. This is descriptively accurate but it’s not where the argument is weak. We’ve already discussed how (B) fits into the argument above. (B) offers a reason for a doctor to “practice what she preaches” by pointing out what could happen on the far end of the spectrum. How effectively does this challenge a doctor being an “exception” to the rule? Not that effectively. The argument’s point stands for most cases. In general, a doctor’s having an unhealthy lifestyle does not prevent her from treating people, even though it’s true that if her health deteriorated badly, then she won't be able to treat people anymore. So (B) isn’t very effective in challenging the claim that doctors are an exception.

If we interpreted (B) to address the issue of the disanalogy, that would be even worse for (B). Let’s just assume that doctors aren’t exceptions, that they instead fit better into the rule. That they should also practice what they preach. If we grant this concession, (B) seems to be arguing that logicians also should not be exceptions to the rule either. The questionable aspect of the reasoning or why it feels wrong to us to say that logicians don’t have to be logical, according to (B), is that the argument fails to take into account that doctors actually do have to practice what they preach. See, says (B), doctors have to do it and so logicians should as well. Problem solved. Logicians do have to be logical, after all.

No. That entirely misses the point! The reason why the analogy failed in the first place is because doctors and logicians are essentially disanalogous when it comes to “practice what you preach.” Whether doctors have to or not reveals no information about whether logicians have to or not, because they’re dissimilar in that regard. They’re disanalogous. (A) pointed that out already. (B)’s reasoning still assumes that doctors and logicians are actually analogous; we just got the direction wrong, that doctors actually aren’t exceptions.

Answer Choice (C) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that doctors who are incompetent to practice medicine can cause more harm than can logicians who discuss logic illogically. Okay, (C) tries to point out a difference between doctors and logicians. The problem is that (C) can’t point to just any difference. The difference has to matter. That’s what’s meant by “relevant” dissimilarity (if you’re trying to disanalogize) or “relevant” similarity (if you’re trying to analogize). What counts as “relevant” changes depending on what specifically the argument is talking about. Here, we are talking about why it’s important for logicians to practice what they preach yet not as important for doctors to practice what they preach. What’s “relevant” isn’t the disparate impact that doctors and logicians have on other people, because that doesn’t expose the disanalogy. What exposes the disanalogy is, again, what was already discussed in (A).

Perhaps a different argument will illustrate the point: doctors are required to attend four years of medical school and then complete four years of residency before they are allowed to practice their trade. Therefore, logicians should also be subject to similar educational requirements. This argument by analogy is vulnerable because of what (C) says. The reason why doctors are required to go through eight years of training is because they have the potential to cause great harm. This is a point of relevant dissimilarity between doctors and logicians. This dissimilarity is why the argument’s reasoning by analogy fails.

Answer Choice (D) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that it’s more difficult to become logical than it is to modify an unhealthy lifestyle. Similar to (C), (D) points out a difference but not a relevant difference. The fact that it’s harder to become logical than it is to adopt a healthy lifestyle isn’t why the argument’s reasoning by analogy fails. Even if the two endeavors were equally difficult, the argument’s reasoning by analogy would still fail for the reasons stated in (A).

Answer Choice (E) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that it’s not necessary for logicians to be logical in order to competently discuss logic, though it is highly desirable. No, it is both highly desirable and necessary for logicians to be logical in order to competently discuss logic.


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This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.

The argument opens with a general principle. Generally, it’s important that people practice what they preach but there are exceptions. The next sentence opens with “For instance…” which means we’re about to get premises. The argument is saying, “Let me show you instances of the exceptions, in case you don’t believe me.”

Okay, so what are the “instances”? Doctors don’t have to have healthy lifestyles in order to treat people. So that’s an instance. Also, logicians don’t have to be logical in their discussion of logic.

Had the argument simply been presented like that, then where we would question the reasoning would be on the two supposed instances “exceptions.” We could argue whether doctors are an exception to the rule or if they actually fit into the rule. We might argue that, actually, it's important for doctors to practice what they preach for whatever reason. This is what Answer Choice (B) tries to argue. And then we’d try to do the same for logicians. Do they fit the rule or fit the exception?

But the actual argument isn't just "For instance, doctors are an exception and logicians are an exception." The actual argument analogizes logicians to doctors. In so doing, the question of whether either fits the rule or the exception becomes entangled. They are no longer separate analyses.

The actual argument pegs whether logicians must practice what they preach to whether doctors must practice what they preach, as if answering the question for doctors reveals some information that answers the question for logicians. That is the crucial assumption at play.

  • Assumption: With regard to whether it's important to practice what you preach, doctors and logicians are analogous.
  • Premise: Doctors don’t need to have healthy lifestyles to treat people.
  • Sub-conclusion: Logicians don’t have to be logical to discuss logic.

That assumption is fallacious because doctors and logicians are not analogous in that regard. This is what Correct Answer Choice (A) points out. If a doctor doesn’t practice what she preaches, then she can still effectively do her job of being a doctor: treat people. If a logician doesn’t practice what she preaches, then she can no longer do her job of being a logician: logically discuss logic. One can even question to what extent an illogical logician can even be considered a logician. Yet a doctor with an unhealthy lifestyle is no less a doctor. (A) points this out. It says that the argument is weak because it failed to take into account that logicians’ being illogical constitutes incompetence whereas physicians’ having unhealthy lifestyles doesn’t. This is where the two situations are relevantly dissimilar.

Answer Choice (B) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that if a physician’s health deteriorates badly, the physician may not be able to treat patients effectively. This is descriptively accurate but it’s not where the argument is weak. We’ve already discussed how (B) fits into the argument above. (B) offers a reason for a doctor to “practice what she preaches” by pointing out what could happen on the far end of the spectrum. How effectively does this challenge a doctor being an “exception” to the rule? Not that effectively. The argument’s point stands for most cases. In general, a doctor’s having an unhealthy lifestyle does not prevent her from treating people, even though it’s true that if her health deteriorated badly, then she won't be able to treat people anymore. So (B) isn’t very effective in challenging the claim that doctors are an exception.

If we interpreted (B) to address the issue of the disanalogy, that would be even worse for (B). Let’s just assume that doctors aren’t exceptions, that they instead fit better into the rule. That they should also practice what they preach. If we grant this concession, (B) seems to be arguing that logicians also should not be exceptions to the rule either. The questionable aspect of the reasoning or why it feels wrong to us to say that logicians don’t have to be logical, according to (B), is that the argument fails to take into account that doctors actually do have to practice what they preach. See, says (B), doctors have to do it and so logicians should as well. Problem solved. Logicians do have to be logical, after all.

No. That entirely misses the point! The reason why the analogy failed in the first place is because doctors and logicians are essentially disanalogous when it comes to “practice what you preach.” Whether doctors have to or not reveals no information about whether logicians have to or not, because they’re dissimilar in that regard. They’re disanalogous. (A) pointed that out already. (B)’s reasoning still assumes that doctors and logicians are actually analogous; we just got the direction wrong, that doctors actually aren’t exceptions.

Answer Choice (C) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that doctors who are incompetent to practice medicine can cause more harm than can logicians who discuss logic illogically. Okay, (C) tries to point out a difference between doctors and logicians. The problem is that (C) can’t point to just any difference. The difference has to matter. That’s what’s meant by “relevant” dissimilarity (if you’re trying to disanalogize) or “relevant” similarity (if you’re trying to analogize). What counts as “relevant” changes depending on what specifically the argument is talking about. Here, we are talking about why it’s important for logicians to practice what they preach yet not as important for doctors to practice what they preach. What’s “relevant” isn’t the disparate impact that doctors and logicians have on other people, because that doesn’t expose the disanalogy. What exposes the disanalogy is, again, what was already discussed in (A).

Perhaps a different argument will illustrate the point: doctors are required to attend four years of medical school and then complete four years of residency before they are allowed to practice their trade. Therefore, logicians should also be subject to similar educational requirements. This argument by analogy is vulnerable because of what (C) says. The reason why doctors are required to go through eight years of training is because they have the potential to cause great harm. This is a point of relevant dissimilarity between doctors and logicians. This dissimilarity is why the argument’s reasoning by analogy fails.

Answer Choice (D) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that it’s more difficult to become logical than it is to modify an unhealthy lifestyle. Similar to (C), (D) points out a difference but not a relevant difference. The fact that it’s harder to become logical than it is to adopt a healthy lifestyle isn’t why the argument’s reasoning by analogy fails. Even if the two endeavors were equally difficult, the argument’s reasoning by analogy would still fail for the reasons stated in (A).

Answer Choice (E) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that it’s not necessary for logicians to be logical in order to competently discuss logic, though it is highly desirable. No, it is both highly desirable and necessary for logicians to be logical in order to competently discuss logic.


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This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.

The argument opens with OPA. Mr. Klemke argues that the complaints made against his company are unfounded. That’s his conclusion (OPC). His premises (OPP) are that the complainants are biased because they disagree with his political views.

Let’s pause there and analyze OPA. Is the reasoning strong? No. It’s a classic source attack. And that’s exactly what the author recognizes and calls out in her next sentence. She says that the complainants can be mistreated by Mr. Klemke’s company regardless of their political views. That’s true. That’s why Mr. Klemke’s argument is flawed.

The author, however, proceeds to draw her own flawed conclusion. She should have simply concluded that “Mr. Klemke has failed to prove that the complaints are unfounded.” That means we don’t know if the complaints are founded or unfounded. We only know that Mr. Klemke failed to make a case for their being unfounded.

What did she actually conclude? That “the complaints are not unfounded.” That means the complaints are substantiated. But they haven’t been substantiated. There’s no evidence at all that pertains to whether these complaints are true or false.

This is a classic flaw that conflates weakening an argument with proving the conclusion of said argument to be false. Weakening an argument erodes the support between the premise and the conclusion. It is engaged at an abstract level with the argument. If you want to show that the statement in the conclusion is false, then you have to descend to the ground level of what the argument is talking about: whose house and what roof and what date was the service provided and what went wrong, etc. You’d have to bring facts (premises) to bear on those issues if you want to prove the complaints are founded or unfounded. That’s very different from the premises the author actually offers which lives one level above these issues.

This is what Correct Answer Choice (B) points out. It says that the argument concludes that a claim (the complaints are unfounded) is false (they’re not unfounded) on the grounds that an inadequate argument has been given for it (Mr. Klemke’s source attack argument is inadequate).

Answer Choice (A) says that the argument takes a consequence of someone’s being biased to be a cause of the bias. (A) charged the argument with confusing cause and effect. But the argument doesn’t do that. What is “a consequence of someone’s being biased”? According to Mr. Klemke, it causes the person to lodge false accusations at his company. According to the author, nothing. What is “a cause of the bias”? According to Mr. Klemke, having political views different from his own. According to the author, nothing. So according to (A), the argument, that is, the author’s argument confused nothing with nothing. Even if we take (A) to be describing Mr. Klemke’s argument, which we shouldn’t because that’s not the argument in question, but just as an exercise, even if we do, (A) is still descriptively inaccurate. Mr. Klemke didn’t confuse a person lodging false accusations at his company with a person having political views.

Answer Choice (C) says that the argument rejects an argument on the grounds that the person who offered the argument (Mr. Klemke) is baised. (C) fails to accurately describe both the premise and the conclusion. The author never claimed that Mr. Klemke is biased. Mr. Klemke accused someone else of being biased. So the premise descriptor is false. The conclusion should have rejected an argument because that would have been the right move. But, as we discussed, it actually rejected Mr. Klemke’s conclusion. So the conclusion descriptor is false as well.

Answer Choice (D) says that the argument relies on a sample of opinions (false, the author’s premise does not rely on a sample of opinions) that is unlikely to represent diverse political outlooks.

Answer Choice (E) says that the argument overlooks the possibility that people whose views diverge are unaware of their disagreement. It’s unclear whether the argument overlooks this but it doesn’t matter because this has nothing to do with why the argument is flawed. Mr. Klemke is a person whose (political) views are different from his dissatisfied customers. Mr. Klemke is clearly aware of this divergence in views. It’s unclear whether his customers are aware.


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This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.

The argument opens with OPA. Mr. Klemke argues that the complaints made against his company are unfounded. That’s his conclusion (OPC). His premises (OPP) are that the complainants are biased because they disagree with his political views.

Let’s pause there and analyze OPA. Is the reasoning strong? No. It’s a classic source attack. And that’s exactly what the author recognizes and calls out in her next sentence. She says that the complainants can be mistreated by Mr. Klemke’s company regardless of their political views. That’s true. That’s why Mr. Klemke’s argument is flawed.

The author, however, proceeds to draw her own flawed conclusion. She should have simply concluded that “Mr. Klemke has failed to prove that the complaints are unfounded.” That means we don’t know if the complaints are founded or unfounded. We only know that Mr. Klemke failed to make a case for their being unfounded.

What did she actually conclude? That “the complaints are not unfounded.” That means the complaints are substantiated. But they haven’t been substantiated. There’s no evidence at all that pertains to whether these complaints are true or false.

This is a classic flaw that conflates weakening an argument with proving the conclusion of said argument to be false. Weakening an argument erodes the support between the premise and the conclusion. It is engaged at an abstract level with the argument. If you want to show that the statement in the conclusion is false, then you have to descend to the ground level of what the argument is talking about: whose house and what roof and what date was the service provided and what went wrong, etc. You’d have to bring facts (premises) to bear on those issues if you want to prove the complaints are founded or unfounded. That’s very different from the premises the author actually offers which lives one level above these issues.

This is what Correct Answer Choice (B) points out. It says that the argument concludes that a claim (the complaints are unfounded) is false (they’re not unfounded) on the grounds that an inadequate argument has been given for it (Mr. Klemke’s source attack argument is inadequate).

Answer Choice (A) says that the argument takes a consequence of someone’s being biased to be a cause of the bias. (A) charged the argument with confusing cause and effect. But the argument doesn’t do that. What is “a consequence of someone’s being biased”? According to Mr. Klemke, it causes the person to lodge false accusations at his company. According to the author, nothing. What is “a cause of the bias”? According to Mr. Klemke, having political views different from his own. According to the author, nothing. So according to (A), the argument, that is, the author’s argument confused nothing with nothing. Even if we take (A) to be describing Mr. Klemke’s argument, which we shouldn’t because that’s not the argument in question, but just as an exercise, even if we do, (A) is still descriptively inaccurate. Mr. Klemke didn’t confuse a person lodging false accusations at his company with a person having political views.

Answer Choice (C) says that the argument rejects an argument on the grounds that the person who offered the argument (Mr. Klemke) is baised. (C) fails to accurately describe both the premise and the conclusion. The author never claimed that Mr. Klemke is biased. Mr. Klemke accused someone else of being biased. So the premise descriptor is false. The conclusion should have rejected an argument because that would have been the right move. But, as we discussed, it actually rejected Mr. Klemke’s conclusion. So the conclusion descriptor is false as well.

Answer Choice (D) says that the argument relies on a sample of opinions (false, the author’s premise does not rely on a sample of opinions) that is unlikely to represent diverse political outlooks.

Answer Choice (E) says that the argument overlooks the possibility that people whose views diverge are unaware of their disagreement. It’s unclear whether the argument overlooks this but it doesn’t matter because this has nothing to do with why the argument is flawed. Mr. Klemke is a person whose (political) views are different from his dissatisfied customers. Mr. Klemke is clearly aware of this divergence in views. It’s unclear whether his customers are aware.


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This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.

The stimulus starts with a claim from many prominent physicists. So that’s OPP. They claim that energy is merely a theoretical construct. Next, the author gives a premise, that the theory of relativity tells us that there is no essential distinction between energy and mass, and draws an intermediate conclusion, that mass must also be a theoretical construct.

First, note that the author uses OPP to further her own argument. This is uncommon. Usually, when OPP is present, the author challenges it.

Next, let’s examine the reasoning in this sub-argument before moving on to the main argument. How strong is the support? Well, the two premises both rely on authority to establish the truth of their claims. The first premise relies upon the authority of “many prominent physicists.” The second premise relies upon the authority of the theory of relativity. When it comes to appeals to authority, the key question to ask is if the appeal is to relevant authority. If it isn’t, then that’s a flaw. Here, the appeals are to relevant authority. First to “many prominent physicists” on what energy is and second to the “theory of relativity” on the relationship between mass and energy. Does that mean the sub-conclusion is validly drawn? No. Arguments that rely on appeals to relevant authority are never valid. But they can be reasonable. This sub-conclusion, mass is a theoretical construct, is reasonable. We can weaken the argument and we can strengthen the argument.

The main argument proceeds to use this sub-conclusion as a major premise. It also supplies another major premise, that all physical objects are composed purely of mass and energy. From those two premises, the conclusion is drawn that physical objects must also be theoretical constructs.

Now let’s examine the reasoning in this main argument. Do you recognize the pattern? It’s a part-to-whole argument. One premise states that mass (and energy) has a certain characteristic (being a theoretical construct). Another premise states that physical objects (whole) are composed purely of mass and energy (parts). The conclusion attributes the characteristic of the parts to the whole.

This is what Correct Answer Choice (B) points out. It says that the argument overlooks the possibility that something (a physical object, the “whole”) may lack a feature (being a theoretical construct) even if it (a physical object) is composed purely of things (mass and energy, the “parts”) that have that feature (being a theoretical construct). That’s exactly right.

Answer Choice (A) says the argument fails to consider whether anything other than physical objects may be composed purely of mass and energy. That’s true, the argument didn’t consider this. Do mass and energy together make up other, non-physical object things? But, wait, it doesn’t matter. Whether the answer is yes or no has no bearing on why the argument is vulnerable to criticism.

Answer Choice (C) says the argument presumes without justification that two things may have different features even if there’s no essential distinction between them. But that’s descriptively inaccurate. The argument actually presumes the opposite. It presumes that two things (mass and energy) cannot have different features if there’s no essential distinction between them. That’s how it drew the intermediate conclusion that mass is also a theoretical construct.

Answer Choice (D) says that the argument fails to adequately address the possibility that features of some theoretical construct need not be shared by every theoretical construct. The argument didn’t address this but it didn’t need to. (D) thinks “theoretical construct” has a “feature,” but in the argument, “theoretical construct” is itself the “feature.” In the argument, “theoretical construct” is the feature of energy and it’s also the feature of mass. We can map (D)’s “theoretical features” onto “mass” and “energy” in the argument, but then we’d have nothing to map (D)’s “features” onto.

Answer Choice (E) says the argument presumes, without providing justification, that the fact that a suggestion has been made by a physicist proves the truth of that suggestion. This is the most attractive wrong answer. (E) targets the reasoning in the sub-argument. Specifically, (E) recognizes that the reasoning there relied on an appeal to authority. This is good. But where (E) missteps is in failing to recognize that the appeal is to (many) relevant authorities. (E) thinks the argument “presumes, without providing justification” that just because “a physicist” made a suggestion, the suggestion is true. But in reality, the argument “presumes, with justification” that because “many prominent physicists” made a suggestion, the suggestion is true. The former would be a glaring vulnerability. The latter, while not ironclad, is much less of a vulnerability. The former is not equivalent to the latter, and therefore (E) is descriptively inaccurate.


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