This is an NA question.
The editorial begins with a premise that last year, many polls found that most people in the country say that they’re tired of celebrity gossip on TV news and that they’re not willing to watch them anymore. But last year’s ratings for TV news soared.
Okay, so something’s not quite adding up. But what is it? At this point in the stimulus, it resembles an RRE, doesn’t it? What’s going on? How can both of these claims be true?
Well, the editorial thinks (concludes) that often people portray themselves as they wish to be perceived, rather than as they actually are, whether or not they’re aware of it.
That could be the explanation. But in order for that to be the explanation, the argument must assume at least two things.
First, we know that somebody's watching those shows otherwise the ratings couldn’t have soared. And it’s a lot of somebodies. In order for the conclusion to follow, we have to assume that at least some of those same people who responded to the polls saying they’re sick of the shows and don’t want to watch them anymore ended up watching anyway. There must be at least some overlap between the set of people who say they don’t want to watch and the set of people who watched. If there’s no overlap, then that means everyone who ended up watching either didn’t respond to the polls or responded to the polls saying they wanted to watch. If that’s the case, then the conclusion cannot be supported on these premises. The argument falls apart.
But even with this first assumption, the conclusion still doesn’t yet follow. What does follow is that often people say one thing and do another. In other words, people are often hypocritical. But that’s not what the actual conclusion says. The actual conclusion says that people often “portray themselves as they wish to be perceived.” Where did that come from? Is being sick of those shows how they “wish to be perceived” or were they simply answering the poll questions without regard to how they “wish to be perceived”? If I tell you I don’t like ice cream, you can’t automatically assume that I wish to be perceived as someone who doesn’t like ice cream. Perhaps I’m just telling you that I don’t like ice cream and the thought never occurred to me that it would make me look bad. Seriously, what kind of degenerate doesn’t like ice cream? That’s the second assumption. At least some people who told the polls that they’re sick of the shows and don’t want to watch them anymore wish to be perceived as being sick of the shows and not wanting to watch anymore.
These two assumptions show up in Answer Choice (B) and Correct Answer Choice (E).
(B) goes after the first assumption and says that last year, “almost everyone” who said they’re sick of the shows and unwilling to watch anymore continued to watch. This is really helpful for the argument. But it’s not necessary. We don’t need “almost everyone.” We just need “some” people. Think about what “almost everyone” means. Yeah, it’s ambiguous but that doesn’t mean it has no obviously right and wrong interpretations. 95% would obviously be “almost everyone” and 60% would obviously not be “almost everyone.” But if it is in fact the case that 60% of those who said they’re sick of the shows yet watched anyway, then it's still really good for the argument. It’s not as good as 95% but it’s still good. That demonstrates (B) as unnecessary.
(E) goes after the second assumption and says that last year, “at least some” people who responded to the polls wished to be perceived as unwilling to watch the shows. That’s exactly right. If this were false, then that means nobody who responded to the polls wished to be perceived as unwilling to watch the shows. That would render the conclusion unsupportable on the basis of the premises.
Answer Choice (A) can be eliminated because of “everyone.” That’s even more unnecessary than “almost everyone” in (B). There’s another problem. (A) is trying to say that there must be an overlap between people who said they’re sick of the shows and people who said they’re unwilling to watch the shows. That’s not necessary. What we actually need is an overlap between either of those two sets with the set of people who in fact watched the shows.
Answer Choice (C) says “at least some,” which is good. The rest of it is not. (C) says at least some people who responded to the polls don’t believe that in their responses they’re portraying themselves as they actually were. In other words, some people were intentionally misrepresenting themselves through their response. Do we need that to be true? No. It’s fine if no one intentionally misrepresented themselves. They still could have unintentionally misrepresented themselves. The conclusion accommodated this already when it said “whether or not they’re aware of it.”
Answer Choice (D) says “no one” who responded to the polls portrayed themselves as they actually were. So everyone misrepresented themselves, whether they meant to or not. We don’t need this either. The argument doesn’t care if half of the people misrepresented themselves.
This is an SA question.
The stimulus begins a premise that defines “practical intelligence” as “the ability to discover means to ends.” Next, another premise places “practical intelligence” as a member in the set of “skills” and “skills” do not develop on their own.
Now we get a conditional conclusion. If there’s a being that was never deprived of anything and was always and immediately given what it wanted, then that being could never possess “practical intelligence.”
Clearly, there’s a missing link. What is it?
This argument doesn’t translate neatly into conditional logic. But at a high level, you know the conclusion is arguing for this being not having practical intelligence. On the basis of what? On the basis of what this being is and on the basis of what practical intelligence is. The premises tell us that practical intelligence is a skill, and more specifically, it’s a skill to discover means to ends. So that’s an opening. And all we know about the being is that it’s never deprived of anything and gets whatever it wants immediately. These two ideas already connect together. Together, it means that this being is never in need of practical intelligence. Why not? Because think about what practical intelligence is. It’s the ability to discover means to ends. But this being always and immediately gets whatever it wants. Therefore, it’s never in need of discovering means to ends. Does that mean it will never possess the ability to discover means to ends? In other words, is it true that if it doesn’t need practical intelligence, then it won’t have practical intelligence?
Correct Answer Choice (B) says it’s true. It says that skills are acquired only if they are needed. Contrapositive: if skills are not needed, then they are not acquired. Kick the idea of “skills” up into the domain. We know practical intelligence is a skill and so this rule applies to practical intelligence. If it’s not needed, then it won’t be acquired. The premises trigger the sufficient condition. Therefore, we can draw the necessary condition as the conclusion.
Answer Choice (A) is a conditional constructed using “without.” Translated, (A) says that acquiring a skill requires the help of others. But the problem here is that the premises don’t trigger the failure of the necessary condition. The premises don’t amount to other beings not helping this being. In fact, if we take seriously the claim that this being gets whatever it wants, then as soon as it wants others to help it, others will help it.
Answer Choice (C) talks about the best way to acquire practical intelligence. But that implies there are other ways. So at best, this precludes the being in the argument from the best way of acquiring practical intelligence. That doesn’t preclude all ways.
Answer Choice (D) talks about a being that is already practically intelligent and how it gets what it wants. We don’t care. We’re trying to make an argument that this being cannot be a being that is practically intelligent. Telling us about beings that are already practically intelligent doesn’t help.
Answer Choice (E) talks about a being that is always deprived of what it wants. At this point, we can eliminate this answer. The premises fail this sufficient condition. Our being is never deprived of what it wants. Failing the sufficient condition renders this rule irrelevant.
This is an SA question.
The stimulus begins a premise that defines “practical intelligence” as “the ability to discover means to ends.” Next, another premise places “practical intelligence” as a member in the set of “skills” and “skills” do not develop on their own.
Now we get a conditional conclusion. If there’s a being that was never deprived of anything and was always and immediately given what it wanted, then that being could never possess “practical intelligence.”
Clearly, there’s a missing link. What is it?
This argument doesn’t translate neatly into conditional logic. But at a high level, you know the conclusion is arguing for this being not having practical intelligence. On the basis of what? On the basis of what this being is and on the basis of what practical intelligence is. The premises tell us that practical intelligence is a skill, and more specifically, it’s a skill to discover means to ends. So that’s an opening. And all we know about the being is that it’s never deprived of anything and gets whatever it wants immediately. These two ideas already connect together. Together, it means that this being is never in need of practical intelligence. Why not? Because think about what practical intelligence is. It’s the ability to discover means to ends. But this being always and immediately gets whatever it wants. Therefore, it’s never in need of discovering means to ends. Does that mean it will never possess the ability to discover means to ends? In other words, is it true that if it doesn’t need practical intelligence, then it won’t have practical intelligence?
Correct Answer Choice (B) says it’s true. It says that skills are acquired only if they are needed. Contrapositive: if skills are not needed, then they are not acquired. Kick the idea of “skills” up into the domain. We know practical intelligence is a skill and so this rule applies to practical intelligence. If it’s not needed, then it won’t be acquired. The premises trigger the sufficient condition. Therefore, we can draw the necessary condition as the conclusion.
Answer Choice (A) is a conditional constructed using “without.” Translated, (A) says that acquiring a skill requires the help of others. But the problem here is that the premises don’t trigger the failure of the necessary condition. The premises don’t amount to other beings not helping this being. In fact, if we take seriously the claim that this being gets whatever it wants, then as soon as it wants others to help it, others will help it.
Answer Choice (C) talks about the best way to acquire practical intelligence. But that implies there are other ways. So at best, this precludes the being in the argument from the best way of acquiring practical intelligence. That doesn’t preclude all ways.
Answer Choice (D) talks about a being that is already practically intelligent and how it gets what it wants. We don’t care. We’re trying to make an argument that this being cannot be a being that is practically intelligent. Telling us about beings that are already practically intelligent doesn’t help.
Answer Choice (E) talks about a being that is always deprived of what it wants. At this point, we can eliminate this answer. The premises fail this sufficient condition. Our being is never deprived of what it wants. Failing the sufficient condition renders this rule irrelevant.
This is a PSA question.
The argument begins with the conclusion that some of the rare pygmy bears should be moved from their native island to the neighboring island. Naturally, we wonder why. The rest of the argument supplies the premises. First, we learned that they are at risk of extinction owing to habitat loss. Second, we learned that the neighboring island is the only place that has a similar habitat. Hence, moving them is the only viable chance of saving them from extinction. That's a sub-conclusion/major premise. The main conclusion is the first sentence. We should move them.
This PSA question is just like most other PSA questions. The argument presents a P and arrives at a C. Our job is to find in the answers a P → C rule or bridge.
We can say something like if an action is the only viable method of saving an endangered species, then we should take that action. Keep in mind that PSA answers can be stated very specifically or very generally. Overinclusiveness is not a problem for this question type.
Correct Answer Choice (C) gets the job done. It says if a species is in danger of extinction, whatever is most likely to prevent the extinction should be undertaken. The premises trigger the sufficient condition because the rare pygmy bears are explicitly said to be at risk of extinction. The conclusion satisfies the necessary condition. Moving them to the neighboring island is the only viable chance and therefore it is the most likely way to prevent extinction. Therefore, it should be undertaken.
Answer Choice (B) can be eliminated on the basis of its logic alone, as is commonly the case for wrong answers on PSA questions. It says rare animals should not be moved from one habitat to another unless these habitats are similar to one another. This stipulates a necessary condition on the movement, not a sufficient condition on the movement. That's a problem for us because the conclusion wants to move these animals. Do the Group 3 translation on the logical indicator “unless.” If the habitats are not similar to one another, then the animals should not be moved. Satisfying the sufficient condition here only allows us to draw the conclusion that these animals should not be moved.
Answer Choice (E) can be eliminated because it's too weak. It's better than (B) in the sense that there is no logical issue. It says if an animal's original habitat is in danger of being lost, then it is permissible to try to find a new habitat for the animal. That's fine, the premises satisfy the sufficient condition, which allows us to draw the conclusion that it is permissible to try to find a new habitat for the pygmy bears. But that doesn't mean we should do it. Permissible doesn't imply should. This is too weak.
Answer Choice (A) says some species are more deserving of protection than other species. This is a truism. Which species are more deserving of protection than others? We don't know. Even if we did, what manner should the protection take? Again, we don't know.
Answer Choice (D) says the rarer a species of plant or animal is, the more that should be done to protect that species. This allows us to draw conclusions about preservation priorities. If we know that the rare pygmy bear is rarer than, say, the panda bear, then according to (D), we should afford priority and do more to protect the pygmy bears. But how is this relevant to the argument? We’re not concerned about whether we're doing too much or too little for the pygmy bears in comparison to some other endangered species.
This is a PSA question.
The argument begins with the conclusion that some of the rare pygmy bears should be moved from their native island to the neighboring island. Naturally, we wonder why. The rest of the argument supplies the premises. First, we learned that they are at risk of extinction owing to habitat loss. Second, we learned that the neighboring island is the only place that has a similar habitat. Hence, moving them is the only viable chance of saving them from extinction. That's a sub-conclusion/major premise. The main conclusion is the first sentence. We should move them.
This PSA question is just like most other PSA questions. The argument presents a P and arrives at a C. Our job is to find in the answers a P → C rule or bridge.
We can say something like if an action is the only viable method of saving an endangered species, then we should take that action. Keep in mind that PSA answers can be stated very specifically or very generally. Overinclusiveness is not a problem for this question type.
Correct Answer Choice (C) gets the job done. It says if a species is in danger of extinction, whatever is most likely to prevent the extinction should be undertaken. The premises trigger the sufficient condition because the rare pygmy bears are explicitly said to be at risk of extinction. The conclusion satisfies the necessary condition. Moving them to the neighboring island is the only viable chance and therefore it is the most likely way to prevent extinction. Therefore, it should be undertaken.
Answer Choice (B) can be eliminated on the basis of its logic alone, as is commonly the case for wrong answers on PSA questions. It says rare animals should not be moved from one habitat to another unless these habitats are similar to one another. This stipulates a necessary condition on the movement, not a sufficient condition on the movement. That's a problem for us because the conclusion wants to move these animals. Do the Group 3 translation on the logical indicator “unless.” If the habitats are not similar to one another, then the animals should not be moved. Satisfying the sufficient condition here only allows us to draw the conclusion that these animals should not be moved.
Answer Choice (E) can be eliminated because it's too weak. It's better than (B) in the sense that there is no logical issue. It says if an animal's original habitat is in danger of being lost, then it is permissible to try to find a new habitat for the animal. That's fine, the premises satisfy the sufficient condition, which allows us to draw the conclusion that it is permissible to try to find a new habitat for the pygmy bears. But that doesn't mean we should do it. Permissible doesn't imply should. This is too weak.
Answer Choice (A) says some species are more deserving of protection than other species. This is a truism. Which species are more deserving of protection than others? We don't know. Even if we did, what manner should the protection take? Again, we don't know.
Answer Choice (D) says the rarer a species of plant or animal is, the more that should be done to protect that species. This allows us to draw conclusions about preservation priorities. If we know that the rare pygmy bear is rarer than, say, the panda bear, then according to (D), we should afford priority and do more to protect the pygmy bears. But how is this relevant to the argument? We’re not concerned about whether we're doing too much or too little for the pygmy bears in comparison to some other endangered species.
The question stem says the reasoning in which one of the following is most strongly supported by the guidelines. This is a rarer type of question though we have seen it plenty before. It’s like MSS in that the support flows down from the stimulus into the answers. They're asking us to take the guidelines in the stimulus and push them into the arguments in the answers to improve their reasoning. But that’s like a PSA question. Instead of the stimulus containing an argument searching for a conditional in the answer, it's the other way around. The stimulus contains a conditional searching for an argument. This is a cosmetic difference.
The stimulus gives us a ton of rules in conditional form. The first one is that if a radiant floor cooling system is to be installed or if it is to be a luxury hotel, then a radiant floor heating system must be installed. The sufficient condition here is a disjunctive, it's "or." That means we can split the arrow, so to speak. A radiant floor cooling system and a luxury hotel are each independently sufficient to demand the installation of radiant floor heating.
rf-cool → rf-heat
luxury → rf-heat
The next sentence is the only other conditional. It hooks up to radiant floor cooling. It says a radiant floor cooling system should not be installed in any hotel that is located in a region that tends to have high humidity during the summer. That means a necessary condition of installing radiant floor cooling is not high summer humidity. Or, contrapositively, if we’re in a hotel located in a region that tends to have high summer humidity, then no radiant floor cooling.
rf-cool → /region-high-sum-hum
Before looking at the answers, take stock of what conclusions are reachable. In general, we can run conditionals forward or contrapose backwards. Running them forward reaches the necessary conditions. Contraposing them backwards reaches the failure of the sufficient conditions. For these conditionals, that means there are four reachable conclusions:
rf-heat (either satisfying rf-cool or luxury)
/region-high-sum-hum (satisfying rf-cool)
/rf-cool (either failing rf-heat or failing /region-high-sum-hum)
/luxury (failing rf-heat)
It’s also important to take note of what conclusions are unreachable. That will help us quickly eliminate answers that are wrong on the basis of their logic alone. In general, affirmation of the necessary condition and the failure of the sufficient conditions are unreachable. Here, that means conclusions of rf-cool or /rf-heat are unreachable.
The first pair of answers I want to consider is Answer Choice (D) and Answer Choice (E). They both contain unreachable conclusions and hence are both wrong on the basis of their logic alone. Look at the conclusions in each. (D) concludes that the newest Bonjour hotel should have neither radiant floor heating nor radiant floor cooling. The “/rf-heat” portion of the conclusion is unreachable. (E) concludes just the opposite, that it should have both. The “rf-cool” portion of the conclusion is unreachable.
The conditionals in the stimulus cannot possibly be used to arrive at those conclusions. We were not told the necessary conditions of having radiant floor heating. And because we weren't told those necessary conditions, we don't know what to fail in order to draw the conclusion that there should be no radiant floor heating. This is the same logic with regard to radiant floor cooling. We need to know what its sufficient conditions are. But the stimulus doesn't tell us what the sufficient conditions of having radiant floor cooling are. Therefore we don't know what we need to satisfy to trigger radiant floor cooling.
Now contrast with Correct Answer Choice (B). It concludes that the newest Bonjour hotel should have radiant floor heating but not radiant floor cooling, rf-heat and /rf-cool. Those are reachable conclusions. (B) says that the region has high humidity year-round. That means it has high humidity during the summer. That fails a necessary condition of rf-cool. (B) also says that the hotel will be luxury. That satisfies one of the sufficient conditions for rf-heat.
Answer Choice (A) and Answer Choice (C) don’t suffer from logic issues like (D) and (E). They both contain reachable conclusions: /rf-cool. We can reach that conclusion in two ways, either failing rf-heat or failing /region-high-sum-hum, meaning either saying that the hotel won’t have radiant floor heating or saying that the hotel will be in a region with high summer humidity. But (A) and (C) don’t do either.
(A) says it’s not newly constructed. That immediately kicks it out of the domain of the stimulus which is guidelines for newly constructed hotels.
(A) and (C) both say that they are not luxury, but that doesn’t trigger anything.
(C) also says the newest Bonjour hotel will have radiant floor heating. That also triggers nothing.
The question stem says the reasoning in which one of the following is most strongly supported by the guidelines. This is a rarer type of question though we have seen it plenty before. It’s like MSS in that the support flows down from the stimulus into the answers. They're asking us to take the guidelines in the stimulus and push them into the arguments in the answers to improve their reasoning. But that’s like a PSA question. Instead of the stimulus containing an argument searching for a conditional in the answer, it's the other way around. The stimulus contains a conditional searching for an argument. This is a cosmetic difference.
The stimulus gives us a ton of rules in conditional form. The first one is that if a radiant floor cooling system is to be installed or if it is to be a luxury hotel, then a radiant floor heating system must be installed. The sufficient condition here is a disjunctive, it's "or." That means we can split the arrow, so to speak. A radiant floor cooling system and a luxury hotel are each independently sufficient to demand the installation of radiant floor heating.
rf-cool → rf-heat
luxury → rf-heat
The next sentence is the only other conditional. It hooks up to radiant floor cooling. It says a radiant floor cooling system should not be installed in any hotel that is located in a region that tends to have high humidity during the summer. That means a necessary condition of installing radiant floor cooling is not high summer humidity. Or, contrapositively, if we’re in a hotel located in a region that tends to have high summer humidity, then no radiant floor cooling.
rf-cool → /region-high-sum-hum
Before looking at the answers, take stock of what conclusions are reachable. In general, we can run conditionals forward or contrapose backwards. Running them forward reaches the necessary conditions. Contraposing them backwards reaches the failure of the sufficient conditions. For these conditionals, that means there are four reachable conclusions:
rf-heat (either satisfying rf-cool or luxury)
/region-high-sum-hum (satisfying rf-cool)
/rf-cool (either failing rf-heat or failing /region-high-sum-hum)
/luxury (failing rf-heat)
It’s also important to take note of what conclusions are unreachable. That will help us quickly eliminate answers that are wrong on the basis of their logic alone. In general, affirmation of the necessary condition and the failure of the sufficient conditions are unreachable. Here, that means conclusions of rf-cool or /rf-heat are unreachable.
The first pair of answers I want to consider is Answer Choice (D) and Answer Choice (E). They both contain unreachable conclusions and hence are both wrong on the basis of their logic alone. Look at the conclusions in each. (D) concludes that the newest Bonjour hotel should have neither radiant floor heating nor radiant floor cooling. The “/rf-heat” portion of the conclusion is unreachable. (E) concludes just the opposite, that it should have both. The “rf-cool” portion of the conclusion is unreachable.
The conditionals in the stimulus cannot possibly be used to arrive at those conclusions. We were not told the necessary conditions of having radiant floor heating. And because we weren't told those necessary conditions, we don't know what to fail in order to draw the conclusion that there should be no radiant floor heating. This is the same logic with regard to radiant floor cooling. We need to know what its sufficient conditions are. But the stimulus doesn't tell us what the sufficient conditions of having radiant floor cooling are. Therefore we don't know what we need to satisfy to trigger radiant floor cooling.
Now contrast with Correct Answer Choice (B). It concludes that the newest Bonjour hotel should have radiant floor heating but not radiant floor cooling, rf-heat and /rf-cool. Those are reachable conclusions. (B) says that the region has high humidity year-round. That means it has high humidity during the summer. That fails a necessary condition of rf-cool. (B) also says that the hotel will be luxury. That satisfies one of the sufficient conditions for rf-heat.
Answer Choice (A) and Answer Choice (C) don’t suffer from logic issues like (D) and (E). They both contain reachable conclusions: /rf-cool. We can reach that conclusion in two ways, either failing rf-heat or failing /region-high-sum-hum, meaning either saying that the hotel won’t have radiant floor heating or saying that the hotel will be in a region with high summer humidity. But (A) and (C) don’t do either.
(A) says it’s not newly constructed. That immediately kicks it out of the domain of the stimulus which is guidelines for newly constructed hotels.
(A) and (C) both say that they are not luxury, but that doesn’t trigger anything.
(C) also says the newest Bonjour hotel will have radiant floor heating. That also triggers nothing.
The question stem says of the following judgments, which one most closely conforms to the principle above? This is a rarer type of question though we have seen it plenty before. They're asking us to take the principle in the stimulus which is a conditional statement and push it into the arguments in the answers to see where it fits. But that’s like a PSA question. Instead of the stimulus containing an argument searching for a conditional in the answer, it's the other way around. The stimulus contains a conditional searching for an argument. This is a cosmetic difference.
The stimulus lays down two jointly sufficient conditions for justified governmental interference with an individual’s actions. The two conditions are:
- The action would increase the likelihood of harm to others; and
- The action is not motivated by a desire to help others.
If both conditions are met, then the government is justified in interfering with the individual’s action.
As an aside, note that these two conditions each cover a different kind of consideration. The first looks at the consequences of the action. Will this action harm others? The second looks at the intent of the action. What motivated the action? In general, considerations of morality tend to fall into these two buckets of consequences and intent.
Back to the task at hand. Given that this is a PSA question, it’s important to note which conclusions are reachable and which are unreachable.
A reachable conclusion is that the government is justified in interfering with the individual’s action. To reach this conclusion, we just have to show that (1) and (2) are satisfied.
An unreachable conclusion is that the government is not justified in interfering with the individual’s action. There’s simply nothing we can show to trigger the conditional in that way. If we wanted to reach the unjustified conclusion, we need to know what the necessary conditions of justified are, fail those conditions, then contrapose back.
This analysis is helpful in eliminating Answer Choice (A). It tries to conclude that the government is unjustified in interfering with Jerry’s moviemaking. We don’t need to read the rest of the argument. There’s nothing that the premise can state that will make use of the conditional to reach this conclusion. (A) is therefore wrong on its logic alone. In other words, it makes a sufficiency-necessity confusion, the oldest mistake in the book. We can stop here, but for review, look at the premise. It says that Jerry’s action (moviemaking) doesn’t harm and won’t increase the likelihood of harming anyone. It also says that it is motivated by a desire to help others. So it fails both (1) and (2). But failing sufficient conditions just makes the rule go away. It doesn’t trigger anything. Yet, (A) thinks it triggers the failure of the necessary condition. That’s textbook sufficiency-necessity confusion.
Contrast this with Correct Answer Choice (E). It concludes that the government is justified in preventing Jill from giving her speech. That’s a reachable conclusion. We just need to show that Jill’s speech satisfies (1) and (2). And it does. Her speech “would most likely have caused a riot and people would have gotten hurt.” That’s physical harm to others. And her speech was “to further her own political ambitions.” That’s a selfish motivation and hence not a motivation to help others.
Answer Choice (B) concludes that the government is justified in fining the neighbor for not mowing his lawn. That’s a reachable conclusion. We just need to show that the neighbor’s not mowing his lawn satisfies (1) and (2). (1) is problematic. It’s not pleasant to look at an unkempt lawn, but that’s not physical harm to others. We don’t need to consider (2) but probably the neighbor’s decision to not mow his lawn was selfishly motivated. He was probably just feeling lazy.
Answer Choice (C) concludes that the government is justified in requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets. That’s a reachable conclusion. We just need to show that motorcyclists’ not wearing helmets satisfies (1) and (2). Again, we have a problem for (1). It’s not clear that their failure to wear helmets would increase harm to others, whatever the consequences of harm are for themselves. We don’t need to consider (2) but probably their decision to not to wear helmets was selfishly motivated. They probably were feeling lazy, wanted to look cool, or have a death wish.
Answer Choice (D) concludes that the government is justified in suspending Z’s license to test new drugs. That’s a reachable conclusion. We just need to show that Z’s testing new drugs satisfies (1) and (2). Again, we have a problem for (1). It’s not clear that their testing of new drugs would increase harm to others. In fact, if they’re a drug company, then it’s more likely that their testing of new drugs would do just the opposite. It would help others alleviate pain and suffering. We don’t need to consider (2) but here the argument makes explicit that their motivation is selfish and not to help others.
The question stem says of the following judgments, which one most closely conforms to the principle above? This is a rarer type of question though we have seen it plenty before. They're asking us to take the principle in the stimulus which is a conditional statement and push it into the arguments in the answers to see where it fits. But that’s like a PSA question. Instead of the stimulus containing an argument searching for a conditional in the answer, it's the other way around. The stimulus contains a conditional searching for an argument. This is a cosmetic difference.
The stimulus lays down two jointly sufficient conditions for justified governmental interference with an individual’s actions. The two conditions are:
- The action would increase the likelihood of harm to others; and
- The action is not motivated by a desire to help others.
If both conditions are met, then the government is justified in interfering with the individual’s action.
As an aside, note that these two conditions each cover a different kind of consideration. The first looks at the consequences of the action. Will this action harm others? The second looks at the intent of the action. What motivated the action? In general, considerations of morality tend to fall into these two buckets of consequences and intent.
Back to the task at hand. Given that this is a PSA question, it’s important to note which conclusions are reachable and which are unreachable.
A reachable conclusion is that the government is justified in interfering with the individual’s action. To reach this conclusion, we just have to show that (1) and (2) are satisfied.
An unreachable conclusion is that the government is not justified in interfering with the individual’s action. There’s simply nothing we can show to trigger the conditional in that way. If we wanted to reach the unjustified conclusion, we need to know what the necessary conditions of justified are, fail those conditions, then contrapose back.
This analysis is helpful in eliminating Answer Choice (A). It tries to conclude that the government is unjustified in interfering with Jerry’s moviemaking. We don’t need to read the rest of the argument. There’s nothing that the premise can state that will make use of the conditional to reach this conclusion. (A) is therefore wrong on its logic alone. In other words, it makes a sufficiency-necessity confusion, the oldest mistake in the book. We can stop here, but for review, look at the premise. It says that Jerry’s action (moviemaking) doesn’t harm and won’t increase the likelihood of harming anyone. It also says that it is motivated by a desire to help others. So it fails both (1) and (2). But failing sufficient conditions just makes the rule go away. It doesn’t trigger anything. Yet, (A) thinks it triggers the failure of the necessary condition. That’s textbook sufficiency-necessity confusion.
Contrast this with Correct Answer Choice (E). It concludes that the government is justified in preventing Jill from giving her speech. That’s a reachable conclusion. We just need to show that Jill’s speech satisfies (1) and (2). And it does. Her speech “would most likely have caused a riot and people would have gotten hurt.” That’s physical harm to others. And her speech was “to further her own political ambitions.” That’s a selfish motivation and hence not a motivation to help others.
Answer Choice (B) concludes that the government is justified in fining the neighbor for not mowing his lawn. That’s a reachable conclusion. We just need to show that the neighbor’s not mowing his lawn satisfies (1) and (2). (1) is problematic. It’s not pleasant to look at an unkempt lawn, but that’s not physical harm to others. We don’t need to consider (2) but probably the neighbor’s decision to not mow his lawn was selfishly motivated. He was probably just feeling lazy.
Answer Choice (C) concludes that the government is justified in requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets. That’s a reachable conclusion. We just need to show that motorcyclists’ not wearing helmets satisfies (1) and (2). Again, we have a problem for (1). It’s not clear that their failure to wear helmets would increase harm to others, whatever the consequences of harm are for themselves. We don’t need to consider (2) but probably their decision to not to wear helmets was selfishly motivated. They probably were feeling lazy, wanted to look cool, or have a death wish.
Answer Choice (D) concludes that the government is justified in suspending Z’s license to test new drugs. That’s a reachable conclusion. We just need to show that Z’s testing new drugs satisfies (1) and (2). Again, we have a problem for (1). It’s not clear that their testing of new drugs would increase harm to others. In fact, if they’re a drug company, then it’s more likely that their testing of new drugs would do just the opposite. It would help others alleviate pain and suffering. We don’t need to consider (2) but here the argument makes explicit that their motivation is selfish and not to help others.
This is a PSA question.
The difficulty in this question is partially in the complexity of the argument. Where is the main conclusion? There’s also a sub-conclusion present! It’s also partially in the answers. Some of the principles on offer tempt us to react based on what we know to be true or false in the world. But if we cut through these difficulties, this is a straightforward PSA question with a straightforward PSA answer: P→C.
First, the ranger says it’s unfair to cite people for fishing in the newly restricted areas. Okay, why? Because the people are probably unaware of the changes in the rules. Okay, why do you say that? Because many of “us rangers” are even unaware of the changes in the rules. So here’s the complex argument.
Minor premise: Many rangers are unaware of the new rules.
Major premise/sub-conclusion: Park visitors are probably unaware of the new rules.
Main conclusion: Unfair to cite visitors for violations.
But there’s one more pesky sentence at the end that says until after we really try to publicize these new rules, the most we should do is to issue a simple warning. How does this fit in? Maybe this is the main-main conclusion? Perhaps. It’s unfair to give citations, therefore issue a warning instead. That makes sense. Maybe this is the second half of the main conclusion? Park visitors aren’t aware of the new rules, therefore don’t cite them (negative), just give a warning (positive). That makes sense too. The conclusion is an injunction with a positive and negative component. Either way you interpret the last statement will be just fine. Something ambiguous like this won’t form the basis of the right/wrong answers. So, for simplicity, I’ll just interpret this to be part of the main conclusion.
Minor premise: Many rangers are unaware of the new rules.
Major premise/sub-conclusion: Park visitors are probably unaware of the new rules.
Main conclusion: Unfair to cite visitors; instead, give warnings.
Before we look at the answers, note that there are two places for us to PSA the support. We can bridge the minor premise to the sub-conclusion or we can bridge the major premise to the main conclusion. What would those bridges, in our own words, look like?
Minor descriptive-P → descriptive-C bridge: If some rangers are unaware of the new rules, then probably visitors are unaware.
Major descriptive-P → prescriptive-C bridge: If visitors are unaware of the new rules, then they should only be given a warning.
Correct Answer Choice (A) supplies the major descriptive-P → prescriptive-C bridge. It says that people should not be cited for violating laws of which they are unaware. If unaware, then should not be cited. Granted, it doesn’t “justify” the “simple warning” bit of the conclusion but this is a PSA question, after all, and not an SA question. The bar isn’t set so high as to require validity.
If you eliminated (A), ask yourself why. I don’t know, but might it be because (A) runs against what you know to be true in the world? Our legal system has a principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Yet (A) contradicts this principle. Is that why you were repelled by (A)?
Answer Choice (C) pretends to supply the minor P→C bridge. It says that the public should not be expected to know more about the law than any law enforcement officer. That lowers the bar for what the public “should be expected to know” all the way down to the knowledge possessed by the least-informed officer. So if any officer is unaware of the new regulations, then the public should not be expected to be aware either. On the face of it, this is appealing. The minor premise says some rangers aren’t aware, and with this principle, we can conclude that the public should not be expected to be aware. But wait a second, the sub-conclusion isn't prescriptive. It isn’t about what the public should or should not be expected to know. It’s a factual, probabilistic, descriptive statement about what the public does or does not know. To justify the minor support structure, we needed a descriptive-P → descriptive-C bridge.
But it’s appealing because we “like” this principle. We think it’s right. We think it’s just. But ask yourself, even if this principle is true, where does it get us? It gets us to the position that the public shouldn’t be expected to know about the new regulations. Okay. Then what? Does that mean they also therefore should be cited? That depends on whether ignorance of the law is an excuse. So you’re back to (A) anyway.
Answer Choice (B) says regulations should be widely publicized. Okay, so publicize them. But what should we do in the meantime? Should we cite or merely warn violators? (B) is embarrassingly silent.
Answer Choice (D) puts the burden on the public. It says that people who fish in a public park should make every effort to be fully aware of the rules. Where does this principle get us? That if there’s some lapse in knowledge about the rules, then it’s squarely on the shoulders of the public? That doesn’t help justify the conclusion.
Answer Choice (E) is a principle that affords violators the right to explain themselves, a right to a defense. Okay, calm down. Nobody is talking about a trial here. We’re just trying to figure out if a warning is enough or if a citation is warranted. It doesn’t matter what the violator has to say about how they view the regulations and whether they think it applies to them.