This is a PSA question.
The difficulty in this question is partially in the complexity of the argument. Where is the main conclusion? There’s also a sub-conclusion present! It’s also partially in the answers. Some of the principles on offer tempt us to react based on what we know to be true or false in the world. But if we cut through these difficulties, this is a straightforward PSA question with a straightforward PSA answer: P→C.
First, the ranger says it’s unfair to cite people for fishing in the newly restricted areas. Okay, why? Because the people are probably unaware of the changes in the rules. Okay, why do you say that? Because many of “us rangers” are even unaware of the changes in the rules. So here’s the complex argument.
Minor premise: Many rangers are unaware of the new rules.
Major premise/sub-conclusion: Park visitors are probably unaware of the new rules.
Main conclusion: Unfair to cite visitors for violations.
But there’s one more pesky sentence at the end that says until after we really try to publicize these new rules, the most we should do is to issue a simple warning. How does this fit in? Maybe this is the main-main conclusion? Perhaps. It’s unfair to give citations, therefore issue a warning instead. That makes sense. Maybe this is the second half of the main conclusion? Park visitors aren’t aware of the new rules, therefore don’t cite them (negative), just give a warning (positive). That makes sense too. The conclusion is an injunction with a positive and negative component. Either way you interpret the last statement will be just fine. Something ambiguous like this won’t form the basis of the right/wrong answers. So, for simplicity, I’ll just interpret this to be part of the main conclusion.
Minor premise: Many rangers are unaware of the new rules.
Major premise/sub-conclusion: Park visitors are probably unaware of the new rules.
Main conclusion: Unfair to cite visitors; instead, give warnings.
Before we look at the answers, note that there are two places for us to PSA the support. We can bridge the minor premise to the sub-conclusion or we can bridge the major premise to the main conclusion. What would those bridges, in our own words, look like?
Minor descriptive-P → descriptive-C bridge: If some rangers are unaware of the new rules, then probably visitors are unaware.
Major descriptive-P → prescriptive-C bridge: If visitors are unaware of the new rules, then they should only be given a warning.
Correct Answer Choice (A) supplies the major descriptive-P → prescriptive-C bridge. It says that people should not be cited for violating laws of which they are unaware. If unaware, then should not be cited. Granted, it doesn’t “justify” the “simple warning” bit of the conclusion but this is a PSA question, after all, and not an SA question. The bar isn’t set so high as to require validity.
If you eliminated (A), ask yourself why. I don’t know, but might it be because (A) runs against what you know to be true in the world? Our legal system has a principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Yet (A) contradicts this principle. Is that why you were repelled by (A)?
Answer Choice (C) pretends to supply the minor P→C bridge. It says that the public should not be expected to know more about the law than any law enforcement officer. That lowers the bar for what the public “should be expected to know” all the way down to the knowledge possessed by the least-informed officer. So if any officer is unaware of the new regulations, then the public should not be expected to be aware either. On the face of it, this is appealing. The minor premise says some rangers aren’t aware, and with this principle, we can conclude that the public should not be expected to be aware. But wait a second, the sub-conclusion isn't prescriptive. It isn’t about what the public should or should not be expected to know. It’s a factual, probabilistic, descriptive statement about what the public does or does not know. To justify the minor support structure, we needed a descriptive-P → descriptive-C bridge.
But it’s appealing because we “like” this principle. We think it’s right. We think it’s just. But ask yourself, even if this principle is true, where does it get us? It gets us to the position that the public shouldn’t be expected to know about the new regulations. Okay. Then what? Does that mean they also therefore should be cited? That depends on whether ignorance of the law is an excuse. So you’re back to (A) anyway.
Answer Choice (B) says regulations should be widely publicized. Okay, so publicize them. But what should we do in the meantime? Should we cite or merely warn violators? (B) is embarrassingly silent.
Answer Choice (D) puts the burden on the public. It says that people who fish in a public park should make every effort to be fully aware of the rules. Where does this principle get us? That if there’s some lapse in knowledge about the rules, then it’s squarely on the shoulders of the public? That doesn’t help justify the conclusion.
Answer Choice (E) is a principle that affords violators the right to explain themselves, a right to a defense. Okay, calm down. Nobody is talking about a trial here. We’re just trying to figure out if a warning is enough or if a citation is warranted. It doesn’t matter what the violator has to say about how they view the regulations and whether they think it applies to them.
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The stimulus begins with a premise about a “new experimental curriculum” that a plumbing school has been using “for several years.” Then it says that a survey last year found that only 33% of the school’s graduates passed the certification exam, and that 33% is not good because the national average is “well above” that. Those are the premises. From those premises, the conclusion claims that the new curriculum has “lowered the quality of plumbing instruction.”
What?
Where did we encounter a decrease in the quality of plumbing instruction? We only have one static data point. We need at least two data points to show change. What was the pass rate last year and the year before? Was it higher? If it was higher than 33%, then maybe instruction has declined. But if it was lower, then maybe instruction has improved. That’s a major issue in this argument.
The only evidence we have from the argument, the results of the exam, shows that there’s something subpar about the plumbing school. It likely has something to do with the quality of the instruction. But there could also be other causal forces at work. Maybe its students. Maybe the school was severely damaged last year in a catastrophic fire.
Okay, so if you spot the weakness, you’re almost there. You still have to jump over the hurdle of the abstractly worded answers.
And it starts with the worst offender, Answer Choice (A). Just look at it. It says the argument is flawed because it treats a phenomenon as an effect of an observed change in the face of evidence indicating that it may be the cause of that change. The quick way to eliminate (A) is to recognize that this is a cause-effect confusion flaw, a commonly recurring flaw in LR. But it’s not what’s happening here, as we discussed above. The mistakes here are (1) confusing static (no change) with dynamic (change) and (2) misattributed cause.
The slow and thorough method involves lassoing the abstract language in (A) to the tangible concrete language in the stimulus. How do we do that? We can begin by looking at “treats a phenomenon as an effect of an observed change.” What is the argument treating as an effect? The decreased quality of plumbing instruction. So that must be the phenomenon. And it’s treating that as the effect of “an observed change,” which must be the adoption of the new curriculum. But wait, is that really a “change?” The curriculum has been in place for several years already. This is already looking to be descriptively inaccurate.
Let’s keep going. How about “in the face of evidence indicating that decreased quality of plumbing instruction may be the cause of adoption of the new curriculum”? What evidence? This is also descriptively inaccurate. The only evidence we have from the stimulus is that something isn’t up to snuff about the school. There’s no evidence that the school saw a sharp drop in its quality of instruction and then decided that they needed to fix this by adopting a new curriculum.
Answer Choice (B) says that the argument uses a lack of evidence that the quality of the school’s plumbing instruction has increased as though it were conclusive evidence that it has decreased. No, it doesn’t. It’s true that there is a lack of evidence of increase. But that’s not what the argument uses. The argument uses the presence of static evidence, the 33% pass rates, as if it were evidence of change. Also descriptively inaccurate.
Correct Answer Choice (C) can, fortunately, be analyzed in terms of premise descriptor and conclusion descriptor. It says that the argument “concludes that something has diminished in quality…” and indeed this is descriptively accurate. The argument concludes that the plumbing instruction has decreased in quality. “From evidence indicating that [plumbing instruction] is of below-average quality.” This is an accurate description of the premises. The evidence is the 33% pass rates. Does that indicate that plumbing instruction is of below-average quality? Not definitively, as I already noted above, but evidence doesn’t have to be definitive. And this is evidence of poor instruction. (C) also captures the move from static (low-quality instruction) to dynamic (decreased quality) that’s at the heart of this bad argument.
Answer Choice (D) says that the argument uses a national average as a standard without specifying what that national average is. This is true! Descriptively accurate! But it doesn’t matter because the argument isn’t weak for failing to specify just how many percentage points below the national average is “well below.” Imagine if the argument had told us what the national average was. Say it was 50%. The school’s pass rate is 33%, which is “well below.” Okay, is the argument better now? No. Because that was never the issue. Imagine again that the national average was 75%. The school’s pass rate is 33%, again “well below.” Is the argument better now? Or is the argument even substantively different now? No and no, because it doesn’t matter precisely how much below is “well below.”
Answer Choice (E) says that the argument confuses a “required” factor with a “sufficient” factor. This is the classic sufficiency-necessity confusion. That’s the oldest mistake in the book. That’s not what’s happening here. We’d have to do major reconstructive surgery on the argument for (E) to be right. We’d have to argue that the quality of a school’s curriculum is essential in the improvement of their graduates' pass rates on the national exam. Therefore, a school can expect to see improvements in pass rates simply by adopting a quality curriculum. That would be mistaking a necessary factor with a sufficient factor.
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The stimulus begins with a premise about a “new experimental curriculum” that a plumbing school has been using “for several years.” Then it says that a survey last year found that only 33% of the school’s graduates passed the certification exam, and that 33% is not good because the national average is “well above” that. Those are the premises. From those premises, the conclusion claims that the new curriculum has “lowered the quality of plumbing instruction.”
What?
Where did we encounter a decrease in the quality of plumbing instruction? We only have one static data point. We need at least two data points to show change. What was the pass rate last year and the year before? Was it higher? If it was higher than 33%, then maybe instruction has declined. But if it was lower, then maybe instruction has improved. That’s a major issue in this argument.
The only evidence we have from the argument, the results of the exam, shows that there’s something subpar about the plumbing school. It likely has something to do with the quality of the instruction. But there could also be other causal forces at work. Maybe its students. Maybe the school was severely damaged last year in a catastrophic fire.
Okay, so if you spot the weakness, you’re almost there. You still have to jump over the hurdle of the abstractly worded answers.
And it starts with the worst offender, Answer Choice (A). Just look at it. It says the argument is flawed because it treats a phenomenon as an effect of an observed change in the face of evidence indicating that it may be the cause of that change. The quick way to eliminate (A) is to recognize that this is a cause-effect confusion flaw, a commonly recurring flaw in LR. But it’s not what’s happening here, as we discussed above. The mistakes here are (1) confusing static (no change) with dynamic (change) and (2) misattributed cause.
The slow and thorough method involves lassoing the abstract language in (A) to the tangible concrete language in the stimulus. How do we do that? We can begin by looking at “treats a phenomenon as an effect of an observed change.” What is the argument treating as an effect? The decreased quality of plumbing instruction. So that must be the phenomenon. And it’s treating that as the effect of “an observed change,” which must be the adoption of the new curriculum. But wait, is that really a “change?” The curriculum has been in place for several years already. This is already looking to be descriptively inaccurate.
Let’s keep going. How about “in the face of evidence indicating that decreased quality of plumbing instruction may be the cause of adoption of the new curriculum”? What evidence? This is also descriptively inaccurate. The only evidence we have from the stimulus is that something isn’t up to snuff about the school. There’s no evidence that the school saw a sharp drop in its quality of instruction and then decided that they needed to fix this by adopting a new curriculum.
Answer Choice (B) says that the argument uses a lack of evidence that the quality of the school’s plumbing instruction has increased as though it were conclusive evidence that it has decreased. No, it doesn’t. It’s true that there is a lack of evidence of increase. But that’s not what the argument uses. The argument uses the presence of static evidence, the 33% pass rates, as if it were evidence of change. Also descriptively inaccurate.
Correct Answer Choice (C) can, fortunately, be analyzed in terms of premise descriptor and conclusion descriptor. It says that the argument “concludes that something has diminished in quality…” and indeed this is descriptively accurate. The argument concludes that the plumbing instruction has decreased in quality. “From evidence indicating that [plumbing instruction] is of below-average quality.” This is an accurate description of the premises. The evidence is the 33% pass rates. Does that indicate that plumbing instruction is of below-average quality? Not definitively, as I already noted above, but evidence doesn’t have to be definitive. And this is evidence of poor instruction. (C) also captures the move from static (low-quality instruction) to dynamic (decreased quality) that’s at the heart of this bad argument.
Answer Choice (D) says that the argument uses a national average as a standard without specifying what that national average is. This is true! Descriptively accurate! But it doesn’t matter because the argument isn’t weak for failing to specify just how many percentage points below the national average is “well below.” Imagine if the argument had told us what the national average was. Say it was 50%. The school’s pass rate is 33%, which is “well below.” Okay, is the argument better now? No. Because that was never the issue. Imagine again that the national average was 75%. The school’s pass rate is 33%, again “well below.” Is the argument better now? Or is the argument even substantively different now? No and no, because it doesn’t matter precisely how much below is “well below.”
Answer Choice (E) says that the argument confuses a “required” factor with a “sufficient” factor. This is the classic sufficiency-necessity confusion. That’s the oldest mistake in the book. That’s not what’s happening here. We’d have to do major reconstructive surgery on the argument for (E) to be right. We’d have to argue that the quality of a school’s curriculum is essential in the improvement of their graduates' pass rates on the national exam. Therefore, a school can expect to see improvements in pass rates simply by adopting a quality curriculum. That would be mistaking a necessary factor with a sufficient factor.
This is an uncommon question stem, but it's not entirely novel. This question stem shares many similarities to MSS and PSA questions. The correct answer choice is accepted by Graham but not accepted by Zahler. Looking at the stimulus, you'll see that each of Graham and Zahler makes an argument. That means the correct answer will contain a claim that helps Graham's argument. That's the sense in which Graham will accept the claim. That's the sense in which this is an MSS or PSA for Graham. But, it's just the opposite for Zahler. Moving from Zahler's premise to his conclusion, we should expect him to reject the claim.
So what does Zahler say? He says that the Graham motor company should stop running its deceptive minivan commercials which claim that the Graham's minivan has foldable third-row seats while Zahler minivans don't. That's his conclusion. On the basis of what support? Well, he says Zahler's newest model minivan actually has this feature.
Let's take a look at how the Graham executive responds. She concludes that the commercial is not misleading. Why? Because Zahler is still selling older models which lack that feature.
So, on the one hand, Zahler says that because its newest models have this feature, the advertisement is misleading. Graham responds by saying that not all the models have this feature—the older ones still lack it—therefore the advertisement is not misleading. With this in mind, we can now comb through the answers to find one that Graham will accept because it supports her argument but Zahler will reject because it doesn't support his argument.
Correct Answer Choice (A) says it's not misleading for a company to advertise that its product has a feature that a competing product lacks if some instances of the competing product that are currently offered for sale lack the feature in question. This is a conditional claim using the “if... then...” formulation. It is also an abstract claim which requires us to pin the abstractions to the tangibles. It’s not misleading for a company (Graham) to advertise that its product (minivan) has a feature (foldable third-row seats) that a competing product lacks (Zahler) if some instances of the competing product that are currently offered for sale (Zahler’s older models) lack the feature in question (foldable third-row seats). This is exactly right. Graham would accept this claim because it helps her argument just like how a PSA answer would. Shoving (A) into Graham's argument makes it valid (or nearly so). Yet, this is precisely the reason why Zahler would reject the claim. The facts in question trigger the sufficient conditions which allow the inference of the necessary condition. Zahler wants to reject the necessary condition and therefore must reject the whole conditional.
Answer Choice (B) differs from (A) only in the sufficient condition. So that's what we will examine. The sufficient condition here is if company executives are unaware that the competing product has a feature in question. The facts in the stimulus failed to trigger this sufficient condition because the executives are aware. Because the sufficient condition does not trigger, the condition is powerless and hence irrelevant. Neither Graham nor Zahler has any reason to accept or reject this claim because it does nothing.
Answer Choice (C) is subject to the same analysis as in (B). It also differs only in its sufficient condition. Its sufficient condition is in a state of uncertainty because we don’t know anything about consumer choice. The entire conditional claim is also irrelevant.
Answer Choices (D) and (E) can be eliminated on the basis of their logic alone, like many PSA answers. Notice the necessary condition here differs from the other three answers. They say that it is misleading if such and such conditions are met. This is problematic. Zahler is the one that wants to claim the commercial is misleading. So at best, these answers allow the facts of the stimulus to trigger their sufficient condition and thereby allow Zahler to draw his conclusion. But, this is not what the question stem asked us to do. We were supposed to find an answer that Zahler would reject. If we want to fix these answers, we’d first have to start by changing “if” to “only if.” With this change in place, (D) would still be wrong since the facts in the stimulus don’t fail the necessary condition. (E), however, would be right. The facts in the stimulus fail the necessary condition, which allows Graham to draw the failure of the sufficient as her conclusion. And this is the same reason why Zahler would reject (E).
Zahler Motors executive: The Graham Motor Company should stop running its deceptive minivan commercial, which claims that Graham’s minivan has a foldable third-row seat while our minivans do not. Zahler’s minivan from the newest model year, which recently began arriving at dealers, has a foldable third-row seat.
Graham Motor Company executive: Our commercial is not misleading. Zahler dealers are still selling new minivans from the previous model year, which lack a foldable third-row seat.
Summary
Zahler Motors executive: The Graham Motor Company should not run its deceptive minivan commercial. Why? Because the commercial claims that Graham’s minivan has a foldable third-row seat and Zahler’s do not. Actually, our newest model of mini van does have a foldable third-row seat.
Graham Motor Company executive: Graham’s commercial is not misleading. Zahler is still selling older minivans that lack a foldable third-row seat.
Strongly Supported Conclusions
It is not misleading to claim that a product has a feature that a competing product lacks in some cases.
A
It is not misleading for a company to advertise that its product has a feature that a competing product lacks if some instances of the competing product that are currently offered for sale lack the feature in question.
This answer is strongly supported. Graham argues the commercial is not misleading solely because there are some minivans being sold by Zahler that do not have a third-row seat.
B
It is not misleading for a company to advertise that its product has a feature that a competing product lacks if company executives are unaware that the competing product has the feature in question.
This answer is anti-supported. The Graham executive is aware that there are some instances the competing product has the feature in question. Graham’s argument is that not all minivans sold by Zahler have this feature.
C
It is not misleading for a company to advertise that its product has a feature that a competing product lacks if most consumers would not choose the product solely or primarily on the basis of whether it has that feature.
This answer is unsupported. We don’t know what features are deciding factors for consumers.
D
It is misleading for a company to advertise that its product has a feature that a competing product lacks if, on balance, the competing product has more of the features that most consumers want.
This answer is unsupported. We don’t know what features most consumers want.
E
It is misleading for a company to advertise that its product has a feature that a competing product lacks if all instances of the competing product that are currently offered for sale have the feature in question.
This answer is anti-supported. Not all of the minivan Zahlers sell have the feature in question according the the Graham executive.
This is a Most Strongly Supported question.
The stimulus provides two different types of information. First, we’re given a correlation, which turns out to be useless. Second, we’re given a logical chain, which is what produces the inference.
The correlation is that darker honey tends to be higher in antioxidants than lighter honey.
The next piece of information, even though it's still in the same sentence, expresses a different relationship. It says that all of the most healthful strains of honey are unusually high in antioxidants. The keyword is “all” which the test writers conveniently hid in the middle of the sentence. If you catch that, you can translate this into an all statement using the conditional arrow. The set of “the most healthful strains of honey” is completely subsumed under the set of “honey that's unusually high in antioxidants”:
most healthful → unusually high in antioxidants
Finally, we learned that there are some strains of honey that come from sage nectar and are among the lightest in color, yet are also among the most healthful. This is a “some relationship,” an overlap in two sets. One of the sets is what we've already talked about: the set of the most healthful strains of honey. The other is the set of honey that comes from sage nectar and is lightest in color.
sage and among lightest ←s→ most healthful
We can chain together this “some statement” and the previous “all statement”:
sage and among lightest ←s→ most healthful → unusually high in antioxidants
This is a commonly repeating valid argument form A ←s→ B → C which produces the valid inference A ←s→ C. Translated back into English, some of the lightest strains of honey produced by bees harvesting sage nectar are unusually high in antioxidants. This is what Correct Answer Choice (A) says. Almost. (A) drops “lightest” but that’s fine. If it’s true that some of the lightest sage honey is X, then it’s also true that some sage honey is X.
Answer Choice (B) says most plants produce nectar that results in light-colored honey. This is unsupported. The information in the stimulus is consistent with most plants producing dark-colored honey or light-colored honey.
Answer Choice (C) says light-colored honey tends to be more healthful than dark honey. This is not supported (or actually, a bit anti-supported). All we know is that darker honey tends to be high in antioxidants. We also know that the most healthful honeys are all unusually high in antioxidants. This weakly suggests that it's the antioxidants that are causally responsible for the healthful effects. If we take that to be true, then (C) is actually anti-supported. But we don’t have to because this is just an MSS question and being unsupported is good enough to eliminate this answer.
Answer Choice (D) says certain strains of honey produced by bees harvesting primarily sage nectar are unusually low in antioxidants. This is unsupported. It’s a tempting answer because we know that sage nectar produces “among the lightest strains of honey” and we also know that there is a general correlation between honey being light and it having less antioxidants. But we also have enough information to infer that sage is an exception to the correlation, because we know that sage-produced light honey is among the most healthful strains of honey and we further know that the entire set of the most healthful strains of honey is subsumed under the set of honey that is unusually high in antioxidants.
Answer Choice (E) says the strain of honey that has the highest antioxidant content is a light-colored honey. This is unsupported. It could be true but it also could be false. We only have information in the stimulus about the set of honey that is among the lightest or among the most healthful or is unusually high in antioxidants. We have no information about the specific strains of honey at any of the extremes of those spectrums.
This is a Most Strongly Supported question.
The stimulus provides two different types of information. First, we’re given a correlation, which turns out to be useless. Second, we’re given a logical chain, which is what produces the inference.
The correlation is that darker honey tends to be higher in antioxidants than lighter honey.
The next piece of information, even though it's still in the same sentence, expresses a different relationship. It says that all of the most healthful strains of honey are unusually high in antioxidants. The keyword is “all” which the test writers conveniently hid in the middle of the sentence. If you catch that, you can translate this into an all statement using the conditional arrow. The set of “the most healthful strains of honey” is completely subsumed under the set of “honey that's unusually high in antioxidants”:
most healthful → unusually high in antioxidants
Finally, we learned that there are some strains of honey that come from sage nectar and are among the lightest in color, yet are also among the most healthful. This is a “some relationship,” an overlap in two sets. One of the sets is what we've already talked about: the set of the most healthful strains of honey. The other is the set of honey that comes from sage nectar and is lightest in color.
sage and among lightest ←s→ most healthful
We can chain together this “some statement” and the previous “all statement”:
sage and among lightest ←s→ most healthful → unusually high in antioxidants
This is a commonly repeating valid argument form A ←s→ B → C which produces the valid inference A ←s→ C. Translated back into English, some of the lightest strains of honey produced by bees harvesting sage nectar are unusually high in antioxidants. This is what Correct Answer Choice (A) says. Almost. (A) drops “lightest” but that’s fine. If it’s true that some of the lightest sage honey is X, then it’s also true that some sage honey is X.
Answer Choice (B) says most plants produce nectar that results in light-colored honey. This is unsupported. The information in the stimulus is consistent with most plants producing dark-colored honey or light-colored honey.
Answer Choice (C) says light-colored honey tends to be more healthful than dark honey. This is not supported (or actually, a bit anti-supported). All we know is that darker honey tends to be high in antioxidants. We also know that the most healthful honeys are all unusually high in antioxidants. This weakly suggests that it's the antioxidants that are causally responsible for the healthful effects. If we take that to be true, then (C) is actually anti-supported. But we don’t have to because this is just an MSS question and being unsupported is good enough to eliminate this answer.
Answer Choice (D) says certain strains of honey produced by bees harvesting primarily sage nectar are unusually low in antioxidants. This is unsupported. It’s a tempting answer because we know that sage nectar produces “among the lightest strains of honey” and we also know that there is a general correlation between honey being light and it having less antioxidants. But we also have enough information to infer that sage is an exception to the correlation, because we know that sage-produced light honey is among the most healthful strains of honey and we further know that the entire set of the most healthful strains of honey is subsumed under the set of honey that is unusually high in antioxidants.
Answer Choice (E) says the strain of honey that has the highest antioxidant content is a light-colored honey. This is unsupported. It could be true but it also could be false. We only have information in the stimulus about the set of honey that is among the lightest or among the most healthful or is unusually high in antioxidants. We have no information about the specific strains of honey at any of the extremes of those spectrums.
A
Some strains of honey produced by bees harvesting sage nectar are unusually high in antioxidants.
B
Most plants produce nectar that, when harvested by bees, results in light-colored honey.
C
Light-colored honey tends to be more healthful than dark honey.
D
Certain strains of honey produced by bees harvesting primarily sage nectar are unusually low in antioxidants.
E
The strain of honey that has the highest antioxidant content is a light-colored honey.
This is an Inference question. The question stem says “properly inferred.”
This question contains two sets of information, one of which is irrelevant and the other of which is what generates the inference. This question is actually closer to an MSS question than an MBT question. This is rare. Most questions that contain “inferences” in the stem are logically tight. This question is conspicuously an exception.
The stimulus states that “most cats like to go outside to play when the temperature is above freezing.” Translating this statement into logic, notice the conditional indicator "when" and the quantifier "most." For conceptual simplicity, let's kick the sufficient condition up into the domain. We are now talking strictly within the domain of when the temperature is above freezing. Under that domain, we are saying that of the set of cats, most of them like to go outside to play. Again, all of this is under the domain of when the temperature is above freezing. Now, as it turns out, and there's no way you could know this beforehand, this statement is completely irrelevant. The only way you’ll realize this is when you consider the answers. None of them make use of this statement.
The next statement creates a conditional chain from which we infer the correct answer. We are now talking about a specific cat. Jamil does not allow his cat to go outside unless at least one member of his family is outside. Translating this unless statement, we get the conditional that if Jamil's cat is allowed to go outside, then at least one member of his family is outside. Next we learned that Jamil's family members go outside only when the sun is shining or it is hot outside. This conditional connects directly to the previous one. If at least one member of his family is outside, then it must be either that the sun is shining or it is hot or both:
J’s cat allowed outside → J’s fam member outside → sun or hot
Now we can run a contrapositive. If the sun is not shining and it is not hot outside, then no member of Jamil's family is outside, then Jamil's cat is not allowed to go outside.
Does that mean Jamil's cat is not outside? This is the space between a reasonable or “proper inference” versus a deductively valid, must be true inference. In order to draw the conclusion that Jamil's cat is not outside, we have to assume that if Jamil's cat is not allowed to go outside, then it is not outside. This assumption is what Correct Answer Choice (E) requires. The fact that this is the correct answer reveals that the test writers think “properly inferred” is a lower standard of proof than “must be true.” Or the test writers made a mistake, though that’s highly unlikely.
I said at the beginning that this question was unusual because the overwhelming majority of questions using the “properly inferred” standard deliver answer choices that meet the higher “must be true” standard. But just because the test writers tend to overshoot a lower bar doesn't mean that the bar has been raised. They are just overshooting what has always been and presently is a lower bar. This is the same lesson we draw from some easier Weaken questions where the correct answer is identical to the ideal answer. That’s just the test writers overshooting the bar. On harder Weaken questions, we see the correct answer requiring assumptions.
The more salient decision for you is strategy: what to do under timed conditions? How do you respond when you detect this gap? The same as you always do. You pick the best answer. Looking at the other answers will reveal that (E) is the best out of the bunch for having made the fewest assumptions.
Answer Choice (A) says if Jamil's cat is outside, then the temperature is above freezing. This answer makes exactly the same assumption that (E) makes, namely that if Jamil's cat is outside, then he was allowed outside. But in addition it makes a mistake in logic. If Jamil's cat is allowed to go outside, then either the sun is shining or it is hot outside or both. It's possible that the temperature is not above freezing because the sun could be shining.
Answer Choice (B) says if Jamil's cat is not outside, then something something. At this point you can stop reading because (B) makes a logical mistake, the oldest mistake in the book: sufficiency-necessity confusion. Jamil's cat not being outside can only be a necessary condition according to the chain we have above.
Answer Choice (C) makes the same logical mistake as (B): sufficiency-necessity confusion. The sun is shining or it is hot outside is at the tail end, the necessary condition end of the chain. You cannot start a sufficient condition with the sun is shining or it is hot outside. It leads nowhere.
Answer Choice (D) says if at least one member of Jamil's family is outside, then Jamil's cat is outside also. This answer also requires the same assumption that (E) requires. Notice it also says the cat is outside as opposed to Jamil's cat is allowed outside. Additionally, (D) makes a sufficiency-necessity confusion. If Jamil's cat is allowed to go outside, then at least one member of his family is outside, not the other way around.
This is an Inference question. The question stem says “properly inferred.”
This question contains two sets of information, one of which is irrelevant and the other of which is what generates the inference. This question is actually closer to an MSS question than an MBT question. This is rare. Most questions that contain “inferences” in the stem are logically tight. This question is conspicuously an exception.
The stimulus states that “most cats like to go outside to play when the temperature is above freezing.” Translating this statement into logic, notice the conditional indicator "when" and the quantifier "most." For conceptual simplicity, let's kick the sufficient condition up into the domain. We are now talking strictly within the domain of when the temperature is above freezing. Under that domain, we are saying that of the set of cats, most of them like to go outside to play. Again, all of this is under the domain of when the temperature is above freezing. Now, as it turns out, and there's no way you could know this beforehand, this statement is completely irrelevant. The only way you’ll realize this is when you consider the answers. None of them make use of this statement.
The next statement creates a conditional chain from which we infer the correct answer. We are now talking about a specific cat. Jamil does not allow his cat to go outside unless at least one member of his family is outside. Translating this unless statement, we get the conditional that if Jamil's cat is allowed to go outside, then at least one member of his family is outside. Next we learned that Jamil's family members go outside only when the sun is shining or it is hot outside. This conditional connects directly to the previous one. If at least one member of his family is outside, then it must be either that the sun is shining or it is hot or both:
J’s cat allowed outside → J’s fam member outside → sun or hot
Now we can run a contrapositive. If the sun is not shining and it is not hot outside, then no member of Jamil's family is outside, then Jamil's cat is not allowed to go outside.
Does that mean Jamil's cat is not outside? This is the space between a reasonable or “proper inference” versus a deductively valid, must be true inference. In order to draw the conclusion that Jamil's cat is not outside, we have to assume that if Jamil's cat is not allowed to go outside, then it is not outside. This assumption is what Correct Answer Choice (E) requires. The fact that this is the correct answer reveals that the test writers think “properly inferred” is a lower standard of proof than “must be true.” Or the test writers made a mistake, though that’s highly unlikely.
I said at the beginning that this question was unusual because the overwhelming majority of questions using the “properly inferred” standard deliver answer choices that meet the higher “must be true” standard. But just because the test writers tend to overshoot a lower bar doesn't mean that the bar has been raised. They are just overshooting what has always been and presently is a lower bar. This is the same lesson we draw from some easier Weaken questions where the correct answer is identical to the ideal answer. That’s just the test writers overshooting the bar. On harder Weaken questions, we see the correct answer requiring assumptions.
The more salient decision for you is strategy: what to do under timed conditions? How do you respond when you detect this gap? The same as you always do. You pick the best answer. Looking at the other answers will reveal that (E) is the best out of the bunch for having made the fewest assumptions.
Answer Choice (A) says if Jamil's cat is outside, then the temperature is above freezing. This answer makes exactly the same assumption that (E) makes, namely that if Jamil's cat is outside, then he was allowed outside. But in addition it makes a mistake in logic. If Jamil's cat is allowed to go outside, then either the sun is shining or it is hot outside or both. It's possible that the temperature is not above freezing because the sun could be shining.
Answer Choice (B) says if Jamil's cat is not outside, then something something. At this point you can stop reading because (B) makes a logical mistake, the oldest mistake in the book: sufficiency-necessity confusion. Jamil's cat not being outside can only be a necessary condition according to the chain we have above.
Answer Choice (C) makes the same logical mistake as (B): sufficiency-necessity confusion. The sun is shining or it is hot outside is at the tail end, the necessary condition end of the chain. You cannot start a sufficient condition with the sun is shining or it is hot outside. It leads nowhere.
Answer Choice (D) says if at least one member of Jamil's family is outside, then Jamil's cat is outside also. This answer also requires the same assumption that (E) requires. Notice it also says the cat is outside as opposed to Jamil's cat is allowed outside. Additionally, (D) makes a sufficiency-necessity confusion. If Jamil's cat is allowed to go outside, then at least one member of his family is outside, not the other way around.
This is a Must Be True, Except question.
Four answers must be true on the basis of the information in the stimulus. The correct answer could be false.
The stimulus tells us that wildlife experts are adding lime to water to counteract the harmful effects of acid rain. How exactly does lime help? First, it neutralizes acid and thus prevents some damage. Second, it also helps to restore the health of some lakes where life has already been damaged by acid. Note the causal language, not that this affects the correct answer.
Next, specific details about this treatment. If a lake is treated with lime, this treatment must be periodic. That’s a conditional claim. Why? Because water in the lake is constantly being replaced and that has the effect of carrying away whatever lime we put in there. That’s a causal claim. How periodically? That we don't know. But we are told that if a lake's water is replaced more than once every six months, then we're not going to use lime because it's too expensive. That's another conditional claim followed with a causal explanation. This makes sense because the more frequently water in the lake is replaced, the more frequently we have to add lime to it. The lakes where the water is being replaced more than once every six months are apparently too expensive.
Answer Choice (A) says if the lake is a candidate for liming, its water is replaced every six months or less often. This must be true. This is simply the contrapositive of the last statement in the stimulus. Note that negation of “more often than once every six months” is “once every six months or less frequently.”
Answer Choice (B) says in some lakes, if liming is to be successful over the long term in counteracting the harmful effects of acid rain, liming must be repeated at intervals. This also must be true for it is simply a restatement of a conditional from the stimulus. The stimulus states lakes in which lime is used must be treated “periodically,” which just means “repeated at intervals.”
Correct Answer Choice (C) states unlimed lakes in which the water is replaced frequently are less likely to be harmed by acid rain than those lakes in which water is replaced infrequently. This is simply an appeal to our common sense. It is entirely unsupported by the information in the stimulus and therefore could be false. We know from the stimulus that acid rain damages lakes. We also know that adding lime helps to protect and restore those lakes. (C), however, talks about unlimed lakes. It tries to compare two different kinds of unlimed lakes, one where the water is replaced frequently versus the other where the water is replaced infrequently. (C) says the former is less likely to be harmed by acid rain. Again, no information above supports this statement. But our common sense wants to say this is true because we think that if water gets replaced, it should carry the acid away as well, which should be better for the health of the lake. That sounds reasonable and it may in fact be true in the world. But that is irrelevant. The question stem asked for valid support from the statements in the stimulus.
Answer Choice (D) says liming can be effective even if it is used after some life in a lake has been killed by acid rain. This must be true. It is simply what it means to “restore the health of some lakes where life has already been harmed by acidification.”
Answer Choice (E) says if a lake's water is replaced frequently, it may not be economical to attack the effects of acid rain there by liming. This also must be true. Depending on how frequently, it may in fact not be economical. And we know exactly how frequently because the stimulus tells us: more than once every six months.