Essayist: Support Knowledge has been defined as a true belief formed by a reliable process. ████ ██████████ ███ ████ ██████████ ██ ███ ███████ ████ ██ ███████ ███ █ ████████ █████ ██ █████████████ ██ █████ ███ ██████ ████ ████████ █████ ██ ████ ███████ ██████ ██ ███ █████ ██ ████ ██████ █ █████ ████ ██ █████ ██████ ████ ███████ ███ ██ █████ ██ ██ ███████ ██ ██████ ██ ███ ███████ ██ ████████████ ██ █ ████████ ████████ ████ ██ ██ ███████ ██ █████████████ ██ █████ ██████ █████████ ██████ ████ ██ ███ █████ ██ ███
The essayist starts with a definition of knowledge: a true belief formed by a reliable process. The essayist then summarizes a criticism that has been made of this definition: even if someone were reliably clairvoyant, we wouldn't accept their claims to know things based on that process. In other words, they might have a true belief formed by a reliable process, and we still wouldn't accept their claims as "knowledge", which suggests we don't agree with the definition of knowledge provided.
But the essayist counters that the reason we would reject such claims is that we don't actually believe clairvoyance is a reliable process. If we did believe that, then we would accept the clairvoyant person's claims as knowledge. In other words, in this scenario, the reason we would reject the person's claims as knowledge isn't some disagreement or problem we have with the definition of knowledge, but our failure to recognize that the definition has been met, because of our beliefs about clairvoyance. Our failure to recognize the definition has been met doesn't mean the definition is untrue.
The essayist defends the definition of knowledge from the criticism made against it. He does this by agreeing that, as the critics argue, we would deny that someone with the power of clairvoyance had genuine knowledge through that power. But the essayist then insists that the reason we would deny this is not that the definition of knowledge is incorrect or that we disagree with it, but because we don't believe clairvoyance is a reliable process. In other words, we don't think the criteria for knowledge, based on the definition above, have been met.
Thus, the essayist shows that the criticism is descriptively accurate, but doesn't actually undermine the definition. The reason we would deny knowledge through clairvoyance is based on our beliefs about clairvoyance, not on some problem with the definition of knowledge itself.
Which one of the following ████ ██████████ █████████ ███ ██████████ ██████ ██ █████████ ███ ██████████ ███████ ███ ██████████
asserting that the █████████ ██ █████ ██ █ ██████ █████ ███ ███████████ ██ ████████████ ██████ ████ ██ ███ ██████ ██ █████████ ██ ███ ██████████
This is correct. The essayist grants that the objection is accurate: if someone claimed to have knowledge through clairvoyance, we would not accept their claims as knowledge. But the essayist says the reason we would reject their claims is our own belief about whether clairvoyance counts as a reliable process, not some issue with knowledge itself or its definition.
asserting that the ████ ██ ████████████ ██ ███ ██ █████████ ████ ██████ ██ ██ ███ ██████ ███████ ██ ████████████ ██ █ ████████ ███████
This might be a tempting answer choice because in theory, it seems like the essayist would agree that if clairvoyance were actually reliable, as the hypothetical scenario proposes, then it could provide knowledge, even if we didn't believe it could. But it's really important to see that while we can infer this view based on the essayist's criteria, the essayist nowhere asserts this specific claim to be true. The essayist's response to the criticism focuses on our reasons for accepting or rejecting a knowledge claim — he doesn't talk about whether any claim actually is knowledge or not, just about the reasons we would accept a claim as knowledge.
arguing against the ██████████ ████ ████████████ ██ ██████████
The essayist never claims that clairvoyance is reliable or unreliable, or that we should believe one or the other of these claims. His argument is purely descriptive, saying that we actually don't believe clairvoyance is reliable, but that if we did, we would accept that knowledge can come through clairvoyance.
explaining that the ██████████ ██ █████████ ██ █ ██████ ██ ████████ ██████
The essayist doesn't talk about personal choice. The essayist starts his argument by defining what knowledge is, and defends that definition against an objection. It seems like he agrees with this definition, which contains no element of personal choice.
demonstrating that the ████ ██ ████████████ ██ ███ █ ████ ██ █████████ ███ ████ ███ ███ ███ ██████████ ██ █████████
This might be tempting, but it's important to see that the essayist doesn't actually say whether, in the hypothetical scenario where clairvoyance is reliable, it actually leads to knowledge or not. We can make inferences about what the essayist believes about this, but what the essayist actually says is focused on the reasons why we would reject knowledge claims based on clairvoyance, and what it would take for us to accept them: our own beliefs about the reliability of clairvoyance. The essayist doesn't say whether the clairvoyance scenario actually does or does not fit the definition of knowledge — he just talks about why we would believe it does or does not.