Self-study
Ethicist: Many environmentalists hold that the natural environment is morally valuable for its own sake, regardless of any benefits it provides us. ████████ ████ ██ ██████ ███ ██ █████ ██████ ██████ ███ ██ ████████ ██ █████ ██████████ ██████ ██ ███ ███████ ████ ██████ ████ ██ ██████████ █████████ ███████ ██ ██ ███████████████ ██████████ ███████ ██████ ██ ███████ ████████ ███ ██████████ ████ ██ ██ ██████████ ██ ████████ ███ ██████████ ██████ ████ ██████████ ████████ ██████ ████ ██ ████ ██████████ ██ ███████ ██████████ ████ ███ ████ ██████████ ███ █████ ██████
Summary
According to the ethicist, an argument for preserving nature is less vulnerable to logical objections if it emphasizes nature’s beauty, compared to emphasizing nature’s moral value. Why? Because beauty can independently justify nature’s preservation. And nature’s moral value is disputable, but its beauty is not.
Notable Assumptions
The ethicist explains some differences between nature’s beauty and its moral value, but then jumps to the conclusion that one is a less-vulnerable basis for preserving nature than the other. The ethicist must be assuming something about what makes arguments vulnerable.
So, the ethicist’s reasoning conforms to the principle that, if nature’s beauty can independently justify preserving nature and is not disputable, then it an argument based on beauty is less vulnerable than an argument based on a characteristic which is disputable.
18.
The ethicist's reasoning most closely ████████ ██ █████ ███ ██ ███ █████████ ███████████
a
An argument in █████ ██ ██████████ ██████ ████ ██ ████ ████ ██ ███████ ██████████ ██ ██ ██████ ███ █████ ██ ████ █████ ██████ █████ ███████████
This contradicts the ethicist’s reasoning, which is that the “beauty” argument is less open to logical objections and directly addresses what makes nature worth preserving.
b
If an argument ███ ██████████ ██████ ██████████ █ ████████ ██████████████ ██ ██████ ███ ██ ██████████ ██ ███████ ███████████ ████ ████ ██████████████ ████ ███ ███████ █ ██████████ ██████ ███ ██████████ ███████
The ethicist never claims that nature’s moral value—or any other characteristic—is an insufficient reason to preserve nature.
c
If it is ███████████████ ██████████ ███████ ██████ ███ █ ███████ ███████████████ ████ ██████ █████ ██ ████ ███████ █████ ██████████ ██ ██ ███ ███ ████ ████ ███████████████
The ethicist says that it’s philosophically disputable whether nature has moral value, but never says that nature would be more worth preserving if it didn’t have moral value.
d
Anything that has █████ █████ ██ █████ ██████████ ██████████ ██ ███████ ██████ ████████ ██ ██ ██ ██████████
The ethicist isn’t concerned with whether or not nature has moral value—or even whether it’s actually worth preserving. The argument is just about which argument in favor of preserving nature is less vulnerable.
e
An argument for ██████████ ██████ ████ ██ ████ ████ ██ ███████ ██████████ ██ ██ ███████ ██ █ ██████████████ ████ ███ ██ ████████ ██ █ █████ ███ ██████████ ██████ ███ ████ ███████████████ ████████████ ███████ ██ ███████
The ethicist says that beauty is a basis for preserving nature, which is indisputably beautiful, and uses that to conclude that beauty is a less vulnerable basis to argue for preserving nature. This principle articulates the unspoken assumption to which the argument conforms.