Supported, because the author thinks an injunction against disclosure of trade secrets is unlikely to be effective at preventing transfer of trade secrets except for those in a physical form. So employers that want to prevent disclosure of trade secrets “might” be better off by trying to keep their employees from moving to another company than from trying to use courts to prevent transfer of secrets. It’s important that (A) uses “might,” because this has a very low standard of proof. The author doesn’t need to show that employers “will” be better off or are “probably” better off. Just that there’s a possibility they’ll be better off by trying to keep their employees from leaving.

This goes against the general direction of the author’s main point, which is that injunctions are unlikely to be an effective means of protecting trade secrets. In addition, the author never compares the effectiveness of injunctions with other methods.

There’s no evidence the author thinks we need to develop ways to redress companies that don’t have proof their former employees are revealing trade secrets. The author never suggests that the law needs to change or that courts should do anything differently.

There’s no evidence the author thinks efforts to protect physical objects with data that can be copied are wasted. The author never discusses copying data and efforts to prevent such copying. In addition, the author thinks injunctions might be effective to prevent transfer of secrets in the form of physical documents and other concrete items.

There’s no evidence the author thinks the psychological barriers created by an injunction have “no” effect on employees. The author does think that the subconscious ways in which trade secrets might be used by an employee will be difficult to detect and prevent, but this doesn’t imply a belief that the psychological barriers have absolutely zero effect.