The author briefly notes at the top of P1 that in some ways, computers can be useful for legal professionals, but she never substantiates (i.e., supports) that claim. Meanwhile, the examples we’re looking at are in P2, and at this point in the passage, the author is arguing that rule-based legal reasoning systems lack usefulness because they can’t deal with issues open to interpretation. She gives examples of situations that are open to differing interpretations in order to illustrate the kinds of scenarios where these reasoning systems fall short.

At this point in the passage, the author is arguing that the key shortcoming of rule-based legal reasoning systems is their inability to deal with rules that are open to interpretation. She gives examples of situations that are open to differing interpretations in order to illustrate the kinds of scenarios where these reasoning systems fall short.

Descriptively inaccurate. The author argues that computers are incapable of handling these situations in practice, not in principle. She states that for computers to handle these situations in principle, they’d need capabilities that they just don’t have in practice.

Descriptively inaccurate. The author doesn’t explain how legal rules are adapted to new situations. She just states in the following sentence that legal rules are sometimes left open-ended so that they can be adapted. And anyway, she’s not talking about the adaptation of legal rules yet when she brings up these examples. She’s simply noting some cases where a simple-seeming concept can be interpreted in different ways, in order to illustrate the kinds of situations where rule-based legal reasoning systems fall short.

Descriptively inaccurate. The author doesn’t discuss or question how precedent is used to interpret legal rules. In fact, she states in P3 that reasoning systems that use precedents (i.e., case-based systems) don’t interpret legal rules.