Psychologist: People tend to make certain cognitive errors when they predict how a given event would affect their future happiness. ███ ██████ ██████ ███ ███████████ ███ ██ ███ ██████████ ██ ████ █████████ █████ ████ ██ █ ██████ ████████ █████ ████ ███ ████████ ████████ █████ ██████ ██ ██████ ██ ██ ████ █████████ ██ █ ███████ ███████ ██ ███████████ ████ ████ ███ ██████ ██████ ██ ████ ████████ █████ █████ ██ ██████ ████ ██████ ██ █████████ ██ █████ ███ ██ ██████████ ██ ████ ███ ███████ ██ ██ ███ ██████
The psychologist concludes that people shouldn’t try to eliminate the tendency to make cognitive errors when predicting how events will impact their future happiness. He supports this with an analogy, saying that people often mistakenly see parallel lines as converging, and, he claims, it wouldn't be reasonable to accept surgery to fix this visual error.
The psychologist supports his conclusion that a certain action would be unreasonable by presenting an analogous scenario in which another action would also be unreasonable. Just as trying to eliminate certain cognitive errors would be unreasonable, so would trying to eliminate certain visual errors, like mistakenly seeing parallel lines as converging.
The psychologist's argument does which ███ ██ ███ ██████████
attempts to refute █ █████ ████ █ ██████████ █████ ██ ██████████ ██ ████████████ ███ ███████████ ██ ██ ███████████ █████
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argues that an ██████ █████ ███ ██ ███████████ ██ ██████████ ████ █ █████████████ ██████ ██ ██ █████████ █████████ ██ ███ ███████████
argues that two ██████████ ███ ███████ ██ ████████████ ████ ███ ████ ██████ █████ ██ ██████████ ██ ████ █████████
attempts to establish █ ██████████████ ███ ████ ████ ████ ██████████████ ██ █████ ███████ █ ██████████ ██████