Conclusion Statistical records of crime rates probably often reflect as much about the motives and methods of those who compile or cite them as they do about the actual incidence of crime. ███ ██████ ███ ███████████ █████ ██ █████ ██ ██████ ███ ██████████ ██ █████ ███ ███████ ██ ██████████ █████ ██ ████ ███ ████ ███ █ ██████ █████████ ███████████ ███ ███████ █████ █████ ██ ███ ███████ ██ ████████ ████ ██ ██████ ██ ███████ ███████████ ██ ███████ █████ ██████████████ █████ ██████████ ██ ████████ ███████████
The author concludes that crime statistics likely reveal as much about the motives of those who report them as they do about actual crime rates. She supports this with three examples: police may underreport or overreport crime to influence their image or budget; politicians may exaggerate or downplay crime to help their campaigns; and newspapers may sensationalize crime to boost readership.
The author supports her conclusion by providing three examples that demonstrate its truth.
The argument proceeds by doing █████ ███ ██ ███ ██████████
evaluating evidence for ███ ███████ ███ ██████████
citing examples in ███████ ██ ███ ██████████
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showing how evidence ████ ██████████ ███████████ ███ ██████████ ████████ ████████ ████ ██████████