Even if some children were as good as adults in identifying their own thoughts, we still know that, in general, “in certain circumstances, young children tend to misdescribe their own thoughts.” Pointing out a few exceptions doesn’t change the overall results, which we still need to explain. Also, the psychologists’ view isn’t that every single young child will be worse than adults at identifying their own thoughts. So (A) doesn’t provide counterevidence to the psychologists’ view.

The experiment concerns young children, so it’s not clear how the fact older children can identify their own thoughts more accurately has any impact. (B) doesn’t suggest another explanation for why young children misdescribe their own thoughts.

This provides an alternate explanation for why the children misdescribed their own thoughts. Perhaps the children simply weren’t able to communicate their thoughts, even if they accurately identified those thoughts. The misdescription could result from poor language skills rather than from failure to identify one’s own thoughts.

Children’s personal knowledge of the difference between direct and indirect access is irrelevant, because the psychologists’ interpretation isn’t dependent on their understanding of this difference. The psychologists think young children misdescribe their thoughts because they fail to identify their thoughts accurately. One can fail to identify one’s own thoughts without being aware of the concept of direct and indirect access to thoughts.

This doesn’t undermine the author’s interpretation, because we still know from the experiments that young children misdescribe their own thoughts in some circumstances. We still observed these results, and these observed results do not depend on the original purpose of the experiments.