PT153.S4.P3.Q17 > Analytics

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Passage A.

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Some legal theorists' position · Judges don't need to believe what they say

Support some legal theorists' position · Sincerity interferes with other important judicial considerations

Inference: according to some legal theorists, judges need to lie in order to do their jobs properly.

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Introduce opposing position · Principle of judicial sincerity

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Prudential argument · Judicial sincerity is good because it promotes "prudential outcomes" (legally better outcomes)

E.g., better guidance to lower courts, better public opinion of the courts.

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Author's perspective · Prudential argument sidesteps the fact that judicial dishonesty is simply wrong

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Alternative argument · Judicial sincerity is good because honesty is morally right

Author appears to favor this argument

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Topic of passage B · Arguments for judicial candor (sincerity)

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One argument · Candor is needed to limit judicial power

If judges lie about their reasoning, it's not possible to tell if they're "following the rules" when reaching decisions.

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Another argument · Lying judges will damage public opinion of the courts

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Author's perspective · Judicial deception may sometimes be permissible, but it has major costs

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Author's conclusion · Err on the side of judicial candor

Passage Style

17.

Which one of the following ██████████ █████████ ███ ████████ ██ ███████ ██ ███ ███ ████ ██ ███████ ██

Judicial decisions should ██ ███████ ██ ██████ ██████ ███ ██████████

Passage A does not rely on this principle.

Moral considerations should ██ █████ ███████████ ██████ ██ ███ █████████ ███ █████████ ██ ███ ██████████

Passage A does rely on this principle. It justifies judicial candor by appeal to this moral principle. Passage B does not. Its argument is based on cost-benefit analysis.

67%

Judicial obligations should ███ ██ ███████ ███████ ██ ██ █████ ██ ██ ███████████ ██ ████████████

Passage A does not rely on this principle. The principle here underlies "some legal theorists" argument, i.e., the contextual argument, in passage A.

14%

Judges should not ███████ ████████████ ████████ ████ ████████ █████ ██ █████ ███████████

Passage A does not rely on this principle.

Prudential reasons that ███████ █ █████████ ██████ ███ ██ █████ ███████ ██████ ████ ██████████ ███████ ████ ██████ ████ ██████████

Passage A does not rely on this principle. Passage A only presents prudential reasons that support the principle.

16%

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PrepTest 153 - Section 4 - Passage 3 - Question 17

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PrepTest 153 - Section 4 - Passage 3 - Question 17

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