PT153.S4.P3.Q18 > Analytics

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Passage A.

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Some legal theorists' position · Judges don't need to believe what they say

Support some legal theorists' position · Sincerity interferes with other important judicial considerations

Inference: according to some legal theorists, judges need to lie in order to do their jobs properly.

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Introduce opposing position · Principle of judicial sincerity

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Prudential argument · Judicial sincerity is good because it promotes "prudential outcomes" (legally better outcomes)

E.g., better guidance to lower courts, better public opinion of the courts.

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Author's perspective · Prudential argument sidesteps the fact that judicial dishonesty is simply wrong

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Alternative argument · Judicial sincerity is good because honesty is morally right

Author appears to favor this argument

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Topic of passage B · Arguments for judicial candor (sincerity)

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One argument · Candor is needed to limit judicial power

If judges lie about their reasoning, it's not possible to tell if they're "following the rules" when reaching decisions.

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Another argument · Lying judges will damage public opinion of the courts

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Author's perspective · Judicial deception may sometimes be permissible, but it has major costs

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Author's conclusion · Err on the side of judicial candor

Passage Style

18.

Each author implies that a ████ ██ ████████ ██████

violates an unshakable ████ ██ ████████ ████████

Author of passage A does not imply this. Author of passage B states the opposite of this.

22%

provides litigants with ████████████ ████████

Author of passage A does not imply this. Author states that judicial candor provides guidance but that doesn't imply that lack of it provides insufficient guidance. Author of passage B does not imply this. Author does not mention litigants at all.

15%

is an unavoidable ███████ ██ ███ ███████████ ███████ ██████ ██ ██████

Neither author implies this. Neither author believes that judges must lie.

14%

could conceivably have ████████ ████████ █████ ███████ █████████████

Both authors imply this. By presenting the "legal theorists" arguments in P1, author of passage A implicitly acknowledges that lack of judicial candor "could conceivably have positive benefits." The author then goes on to say that in spite of those positive benefits, there are strong reasons to insist on judicial candor anyway. Author of passage B argues that judicial candor can be sacrificed under some cost-benefit analyses.

35%

is likely to ██ ████████ ██ ██ █████████ ████ █ ██████████ ██████ ██ ████

Author of passage A does not imply this. Author doesn't even mention detection.

14%

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PrepTest 153 - Section 4 - Passage 3 - Question 18

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PrepTest 153 - Section 4 - Passage 3 - Question 18

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