Passage B doesn’t discuss concepts that are incompatible with each other (contradictory). So we have no reason to think Passage B uses the principle in (A).

Passage B uses this concept toward the end of P1 and the beginning of P2. Research shows that certain Indian people have the concept of number. But they don’t have expressions for that concept. Passage B believes this supports the idea that language did not create the concept of numbers for those people.

Passage A doesn’t use this principle, because it doesn’t discuss speakers who possess concepts without language for that concept.

Passage B doesn’t discuss the ability to learn different languages. So it doesn’t use the principle in (C).

Passage B isn’t committed to the view that if a concept (such as number) can be expressed more exactly in one language, that language created the concept. It explicitly notes alternative interpretations — language might “mediate the expansion” of a concept or might merely “direct attention to such a concept.” So Passage B doesn’t use the principle in (D).

Passage B doesn’t suggest that there’s a connection between a language’s obliging speakers to think about a concept and the independent origin of the concept. The only mention of a language obliging a speaker to think about a concept is the reference to number words potentially “directing attention” to the concept of numerical equality. But the author of Passage B doesn’t connect this potential relationship to the conclusion that numerical equality is a concept independent of language.