Passage B does not present a counterexample to Passage A’s view. We don’t get in Passage B an example of paranormal phenomena not existing. Although Passage B does mention scientific experiments that have failed to prove the existence of paranormal phenomena, those experiments are not specific examples of paranormal phenomena not existing. They’re evidence that tends to undermine the view that paranormal phenomena exist.

Even if you thought those experiments were examples, (A) would still be wrong because the primary purpose of Passage B is not to present examples, but rather to show why the view in Passage A is wrong. Any use of examples in Passage B would be in service of the broader purpose of rejecting Passage A’s view.

Passage A’s view that paranormal phenomena may exist is too narrow to be a “wide-ranging new theory.” But, let’s set this aside, because we can eliminate (B) more easily based on Passage B.

Passage B does much more than “take issue with some details” of Passage A’s view. Passage B fully rejects Passage A’s argument that paranormal phenomena might exist despite the lack of scientific evidence.

(C) captures the purposes of each passage well. Passage A argues that it is possible for paranormal phenomena to exist. Passage B rejects Passage A’s argument.

We don’t know the mainstream view regarding the existence of paranormal phenomena. So, we can’t say that Passage A questions that view.

In any case, Passage B’s argument isn’t presented as a defense of any viewpoint; it’s a takedown of Passage A’s argument in favor of the potential existence of paranormal phenomena. Although it’s possible for an attack on someone else’s view to be framed as a defense of the opposite view, that’s not how Passage B is framed. Passage B never characterizes claims from Passage A as “charges” (specific criticisms) against the view that paranormal phenomena does not exist.

Passage A never claims that a theory says “X is true,” but later implies “X is not true.” In other words, Passage A never identifies a theory that contradicts itself. Passage B also never makes a statement related to a self-contradictory theory.

Although Passage B states that Freeman Dyson “recognizes that his belief in the possibility of paranormal phenomena conflicts with his scientific views,” that’s not a claim that any individual theory is self-contradictory. Instead, that’s a claim that one belief (possibility of paranormal phenomena) contradicts other beliefs (“scientific views”). On top of that, Passage B’s point is that this conflict in Dyson’s views is real and meaningful. Passage B does not argue that this conflict is “only apparent” (i.e. looks like a contradiction but isn’t really a contradiction).