Consumer advocate: One advertisement that is deceptive, and thus morally wrong, states that “gram for gram, the refined sugar used in our chocolate pies is no more fattening than the sugars found in fruits and vegetables. ████ ██ ████ ██████ ██ ████████ ███████ ████ █████████ ████ ███ ███ █████████ ██ ██████ █████ ███████ ███ ████████ ████ ███ ██ ████ █████████ ████ ███████ █████ ███ ██ █████ ████ █ █████ ████████ ████ ████ ██ ██████ ██ █████ █ █████████ ███████ █████ ██ █████████
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The consumer advocate claims that it is deceptive, and therefore morally wrong, to advertise with the claim that "gram for gram," the sugar in chocolate pies is "no more fattening" than the sugars in fruits and vegetables. The advocate supports this position with an analogy: such a claim would be similar to trying to persuade someone that chocolate pies aren't fattening, because "calorie for calorie," chocolate pies are no more fattening than celery. She concedes that the claim is technically true, but points out that you need much more celery to obtain the same amount of calories as in a single chocolate pie.
The advertiser rejects the advocate's claim that the advertisement is deceptive on the grounds that the statement in the advertisement is true.
We're looking for a principle that supports the advocate's position. Though this is posed as a Strengthening question, we can use a PSA-style approach here, because it definitely strengthens the argument if we find a principle that works as a sufficient assumption. So let's figure out the premise → conclusion structure of the advocate's argument, as we would for a PSA-style question.
The conclusion of the advocate's argument states that the advertisement is "deceptive, and thus morally wrong." But to support this claim, the advocate draws an analogy to a claim she concedes is factually true — which is the point the advertiser makes in his response. The advertiser argues that a claim cannot be called deceptive if it is true; meanwhile, it seems like the advocate is saying that a claim can be true and yet still be deceptive. The problem she highlights with the claim in her analogy is that, while the claim about chocolate pies being "no more fattening" than celery calorie for calorie is factually true, it doesn't acknowledge the important difference that a given amount of celery contains many fewer calories than the same amount of chocolate pie, and is meant to lead someone to make an inference that isn't true (that chocolate pies aren't fattening).
So it seems like a good pre-phrase for the assumption underlying the advocate's argument is that if a claim meant to encourage people to make a certain decision is factually true, but hides information relevant to the decision, it is "deceptive." This covers the premise → conclusion structure of the advocate's argument, and would, if true, strongly support her argument.
Which one of the following ███████████ ██ ████████████ █████ ██ ████ ██ ███████ ███ ████████ ████████████ ████████ ███████ ███ ██████████████ █████████
It is morally █████ ██ ████ ██ ████████ ██ ███ ██ █████████ ███████████
Incorrect. This principle only addresses the internal logic of the author's conclusion: that because the advertisement is deceptive, it is morally wrong. This principle doesn't address the premise → conclusion gap in the argument, that somehow a technically true claim can still be deceptive.
A true statement ██████ ██ ████████ ██ █████████ ████ ██ ███ ██████ ██████ ███ █████████ ████████ ██ ██ ██ ██████ ███ ████ ███████ ███ ██████ ███████ ██ ███████ ██ ██ ███████ █ █████ ███████
Incorrect. This doesn't strengthen the advocate's argument because the advocate never claims that the advertisers believe the claim to be false. The advocate seems to concede that the claim might technically be true, and never suggests that the advertisers themselves believe otherwise.
To make statements ████ ██████ ████ █ █████ ██████████ ██ ███ ███████████ ██ ███████ ██████████ ██████ ███ ███████████ ██ ████████ ██ ██████████
Incorrect. This would support the advertiser's argument, not the advocate. The advocate is almost saying the opposite, that to share only part of the relevant information does count as deceptive.
It is morally █████ ██ ████ █ ████ █████████ ██ █ ██████ ████ ████ ███████ ███████ ██ ███████ ██ ███ █████████ ████ █████████ ████ ██ ██ ██████
Incorrect. The advocate never claims that the problem with the advertisement is that hearers or readers of the claim will somehow believe that the specific claim is false. The problem is that the claim doesn't give them all the information, and from just hearing that claim and believing it to be true, they might draw a false conclusion.
A true statement ██████ ██ ████████ ██ █████████ ██ ██ ██ ████ ████ ███ ███████████ ████ ██████ ███████ ██ ███████ ███ █████████ ████ ████ █ █████ ██████████ ████ ███
Correct. This might seem a bit different from our pre-phrase, but it covers the premise → conclusion gap just as well. Notice that in the advocate's analogy, not only does the claim not disclose all the relevant information, but it is specifically made with the intention of leading someone to a false conclusion: that chocolate pies are not fattening. So the principle in (E) — that when a true statement is made with the expectation that people hearing it will draw a false conclusion from it — effectively strengthens the advocate's argument, and her conclusion that the advertisement is deceptive.