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In a nutshell, the developer says there is a country whose strict regulatory rules ban personal property holders from erecting buildings on their plot if any rarified animals in danger on the land. These rules render the existence of those animals a serious fiscal burden on them as their hands are tied businesswise. By virtue of those sacred beings, the proprietors feel reluctant about sheltering them and shielding them from harms. Therefore, endangered species would very likely not be jeopardized, if not better served, if the bureaucratic red tape is peeled off for good.
(A) is not the one we are looking for. Because the author is not mixed up between the absence of a condition or the presence of a condition that is no longer in effect which was designed to protect the endangered species from the outset but would be revoked on the assumption that its absence would not likely to harm them and a condition that would be obliged to avoid the endangerment of those rare species on the land.
is somewhat irrelevant. Above all, there is no morality-bound call or moral verdict grounded on fact-based assertions or accounts. In my opinion, a value judgment is like this: it is not ethical for humans to endanger those rarified species further by not protecting their subsistence. But this argument is the opposite of the developer's conclusion. Based on the factual grounds, he/she thinks one could go back on this duty because his assessment projects that this dispensation/waiver/relief does not likely harm those species. It rationalizes a claim based on the alleged facts without a value judgment.
(C) is the guy we have been searching for. This Mr. Right has it all. It, all of a sudden, somewhat irrationally, snubs any probability that even if some factors are prone to engender a presumed effect, they might be likely to beget more powerful countermanding/offsetting effects too. Then the final outcome could be more harm to those animals.
For instance, this suspension of the rule application might put those animals out of harm's way if those landowners just do not do anything about this roll-back except feeling happy about the exemption of the financial liability. However, what if there are other hyenas lurking around to capitalize on this repeal? They could be poachers eager to snare those animals to make money out of them. It could backfire on those animals which are be supposed to be protected in the absence of those rules.
(D) is a bit weird-do. No need to zoom in on those landowners to play a blame game. Those landowners could indeed enjoy the removal of regulatory rules in a different way than anticipated. For instance, once those regulations are rescinded, they decide to turn those animals into their cash cow to rake in dollars. Sure, it is possible. But it is not a flaw that is the most noticeable in his argument. The principal perp is his negligence about considering the side effects or backlash from the revocation esp. from the perspective of those animals meant to be protected by design. That was what his/her conclusion was about.
(E) is a total jerk and a typical A-hole wasting my time. This argument has no bearing on those landowners on whose tract no endangered species live.