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PT49 S2 Q18
+LR
Flaw or descriptive weakening +Flaw
A
3%
155
B
14%
161
C
6%
157
D
10%
158
E
67%
166
146
156
166
+Harder 146.896 +SubsectionMedium

(E) conflation of distinct ideas. Understanding that a phenomenon has property X doesn't mean that we should use reasoning with property X to understand that phenomenon.

Supplementary explanation
This is a very silly argument that reads like it's actually reasonable.

We're presented with a thing called nature. We're told that nature has certain properties, XYZ. Therefore, we're told, that the thinking used to understand nature should also have those properties, XYZ.

This argument is insane. It escapes our insanity detector only because the LSAT writers are clever and picked out the "XYZ" so as not to raise alarm. They wrote "organic, holistic, etc", which to us are familiar properties of thinking/reasoning.

But by that logic, I can say, "Hey look at that stupid bear over there, scratching his ass on that tree cause his stupid paws can't reach. The best way to understand the bear is as a hairy beast. Therefore, use we should use our hairy beastly thinking when trying to study and analyze the bear."

Can we all say in unison: "No, dumbass. Use Biology."

See how that didn't escape our insanity detector? That's because "hairy beastly thinking" is obviously not a thing whereas "organic holistic thinking" is.

(E) calls the argument out on its absurdity. Properties of the object to be studied shouldn't be projected onto the reasoning used to study that object.

(B) is having his own conversation over in the corner of the room by himself. It's saying that the structure of nature isn't identical to the structure of how people reason about nature. Okay, sure. Let's not even argue what the overall "structure" of nature is and just concede that it's "organic". So (B) is saying that that's not always identical to the structure of how people reason about nature. In other words, people don't always reason organically about it. Again, okay sure. So what? Is that a bad thing? Should people reason organically about it?

The argument isn't terrible because sometimes the structure of a phenomenon is not identical with the structure of reasoning people use to understand that phenomenon.