Support The more profitable a corporation is, the more valuable its managers' time is. ββ β βββββββ ββ ββ ββββββββββ ββββββ βββ ββββββ ββββββββββ ββββββββββββ ββ ββββ βββββ ββββββββ βββββ ββββ ββββββββββ ββββββββββ ββββ ββββββββββββ βββ ββββ βββββ ββ ββββββββ ββββ βββββββββββ ββ ββββ ββ βββ βββββββββ βββ βββββ ββββββ ββββββββββ ββ ββββ βββββββ βββββ ββ ββββββ ββββββββββ ββββββββββββ βββ ββββ βββββ ββ ββββββ βββββ βββββββββ βββββββββ ββββββββ
The author concludes that highly profitable companies can save money by paying large bonuses. The author reasons that:
1) It is very costly for managers to spend time monitoring employees
3) Corporations can save money by reducing this monitoring and instead providing incentives to work hard
One assumption is that bonuses are a strong incentive to continue working hard. Itβs possible that workers just take the bonuses and donβt work any harder β the stimulus doesnβt have any evidence about whether they will be effective.
Another assumption is that the size of the bonuses is less than the cost of the monitoring. We know that monitoring is very costly, but the stimulus doesnβt tell us exactly how much the expensive bonuses will cost. If the bonuses cost more than the monitoring, then the company wonβt save money.
The argument requires the assumption ββββ
only a few ββββββββββββ ββββ βββββ βββββββββ βββββββ ββββ βββββββ ββββββ ββββββ ββββββββββ βββ βββ βββββββββ ββ ββββ βββββββ ββββ ββββ ββββ ββββ βββ βββ βββββ βββββββββ
if a highly ββββββββββ βββββββββββ βββββ ββββ βββββ ββ ββββββ βββ βββββββββ βββββββββ ββββββββ ββ ββ βββββββ ββββββ ββββ βββββββ βββββ ββββββ βββ ββββββ ββ ββββ βββ ββββββββ ββββ βββββ ββββββββββ βββββ βββββββββ
the more valuable βββ βββββββββ ββββ ββ ββ β ββββββββββββ βββ ββββ ββββββ ββ ββ ββββ βββ βββββββββββ ββββ ββββββββ ββββ βββββ ββββββββ βββββ ββββ ββββββββββ βββββββββ
for people who βββ βββββββββ ββ ββββββ ββββββββββ ββββββββββββ βββββ ββββββββββ ββ ββββββββ βββββββββ βββββββ ββββββββββ ββββββ ββββββββββ ββ ββββ βββββββ ββββ
a highly profitable βββββββββββ βββ ββββ βββββ ββ ββββββββ βββ βββββββββ ββββββββββ ββ βββββββββ ββββ ββ βββ βββββββββ βββ βββββ βββββββββ βββββββ