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While a lack of support for one line of reasoning can make other more supported lines of reasoning more attractive, it does not necessarily equate to strengthening for another. In a world where there was were binary explanations for this phenomenon, perhaps rejecting one explanation allows us to accept another, but this is never the case in reality. Equating a rejection of support for one hypothesis as support for another is a flaw that was presented previously in flaw questions.
Kevin cannot hide his class consciousness even for a second
Yeah, I did not interpret "assumed" in the LR sense and that's exactly why I got it wrong. As soon as I actually read and processed the correct answer it clicked immediately. Gotta appreciate the test writers consistency at least!
That's exactly how I've been approaching it. Why bother trying to waste time and energy abbreviating premises that aren't going to translate outside of their specific role and position, when you can just identify each distinct premise, and map that onto A, B, C, so on and so forth?
I suppose we'll find out if this will bite us in the ass soon enough
My understanding is that that's more or less the rationale behind the shallow dip analysis. A quick dirty look to see if the arguments utilize the same types and numbers of conditional links, if they don't it doesn't even matter if they are connected in the right order.
There is no sufficient/necessary confusion here. Let's break down the possible outcomes. Once the conditionals are chained as mentioned above we have a statement that looks like this, where SD = sunny day, BS = birds sing, and JH = jane is happy:
SD → BS → JH
accompanied by this contrapositive:
/JH → /BS → /SD
From this we know that:
A sunny day is sufficient to guarantee that Jane will be happy, and that Jane being happy is necessary whenever there is sunny day. Meanwhile Jane not being happy is sufficient to guarantee that it is not a sunny day, while it not being a sunny day is necessary for Jane to not be happy.
Therefore, we can validly infer that if Jane isn't happy, it isn't a sunny day, Since
What we cannot validly infer is: "It is not sunny, therefore Jane is not happy",. She could be, she could not, since there are potentially other sufficient conditions to trigger Jane's happiness outside of a sunny day (satisfying the necessary condition of the contrapositive tells us nothing about whether or not the sufficient condition is satisfied.)
We also cannot validly infer that it is a sunny day simply because Jane is happy, because said above there are potentially other sufficient conditions to trigger Jane's happiness.
Simply put: It not being sunny tells us nothing about whether or not it's Jane is happy, and Jane's happiness tells us nothing about whether or not it's sunny"
If you're still confused, I would recommend reviewing the lessons on sets and supersets, taking contrapositives, and chaining conditionals. For me in particular I found it extremely helpful to define sufficiency and necessity, with respect to sets and supersets, and then continue to relate those concepts back to one another, repeatedly making use of the circle diagrams that were used to introduce sets and supersets, being able to see the actual physical relationship of the sets is very helpful.
Keep in mind, here is a reason formal logic has been studied for thousands of years, and continues to draw confusion and ire: because it is truly difficult. People dedicate lives to studying these relationships, we need only a high level overview.
Only where only is present before where is where a necessary indicator.
where is necessary indicator → only precedes where
/only precedes where → /where is a necessary indicator
I did some research and it does appear that the distinction between the two does indeed lie in both the content, form and application of the argument.
A good post making the specific distinction for those interested (which I still don't understand all the particulars of): https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/h9jglu/what_is_the_difference_between_a_hypothetical/
very interesting stuff, logicians and logic enthusiasts are crazy
Could it be helpful, for modus ponens (and other arguments hinging on a certain set of circumstances then setting into motion more circumstances) consider the reality presented by the premises to be the individual we are assessing, just like how we assess whether or not Garfield is a member of the cat set.
For example:
- If new restaurants open downtown, then quality of life will improve for downtown residents
New restaurants open downtown, therefore quality of life improves
is the same as
Reality is a member of the set of instances where new restaurants opened downtown, therefore quality of life improves for downtown residents.
or to use a different argument
- All cats are mammals
Garfield belongs to the set cat, therefore Garfield is mammal
is the same as
Garfield satisfies the condition of being a cat, therefore Garfield is a mammal
Is this thought experiment just confusing? In assessing the arguments from this perspective, how are sets and conditions any different. I don't really see how modus ponens and a categorical syllogism can be substantially different, unless the content of the argument is a factor in classifying the type of logic rather than just the base form. I am not a logician, so I really don't know.
If we changed the wording in answer choice A from "Because, several of the candidates........" to "Although, several of the candidates......" could this then become an answer that would reconcile at least some of the discrepancy exhibited?
I understood the students "preference" to mean that there are other (perhaps more important) factors the students might consider when choosing their university president. However, I understand that I smuggled the assumption that the students did in fact have other criteria in mind that might have overridden their want for a president with experience when I chose answer A.
I find the link between the stimulus and principle incredibly tenuous. Is it a correct understanding that there really is no (or a very weak) causal link between small spots and vulnerability to predation presented??? The stimulus merely presents the phenomenon of small spottedness and the ability to avoid the detection of predators as coincident and not necessarily related or causal phenomenon.
Of course the correct answer is correct because it is the most correct answer choice. But it can be argued that the connection between the principle and the stimulus is tenuous at best since it requires the (easy to make) assumption of an earlier implied causal relationship
While I always appreciate the detailed breakdowns of why wrong answers are wrong, and the delving into conditional and causal reasoning, grammar parsing, and unpacking the other intricacies of the syntax, I wonder if it can be unhelpful sometimes. I feel that, before even unpacking the answers many can be eliminated just with a surface level analysis spurred on by the question: "Does the stimulus even mention this?"
LSAT writers take advantage of our instinct to supplement the little (often confusing) information contained within the question stimulus, with our own background knowledge and assumptions (though this CAN be helpful.. for example if you already knew that sharks have a skeleton composed of cartilage and not bone.) Though, more often than not it's actually terribly unhelpful.
What I find most helpful when reading the question stimulus if to FORGET all other background information, and remind myself that really the only information needed to correctly answer the question is contained within it, and then move forward from there.
My new LSAT mantras are now: "Stick with your gut, your gut is right" very dissapointed that I gaslit myself into thinking the testwriters were trying to trick me