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I’m so offended by this question. So people of Indian ethnicity eat more Indian curries? Just like Americans eat more burgers, African Americans eat more fried chicken, Chinese people eat more rice, and Japanese people eat more sushi? Jeez. Listen to yourself, LSAC. Yall should be ashamed of yourselves. If anybody’s organizing a petition to get this question removed retroactively, I’ll be here to sign it.
I guess we’re somewhere in the spring? So in January or February next year, Jennifer will still have worked for less than four years and will be entitled to exactly three weeks of paid vacation for that year. But once we’re in March or April, she will have worked for four years, and this rule will no longer apply to her: the amount of paid vacation she will be entitled to will then depend on some other body of rules. It is likely that she will get more than three weeks as a senior employee. So in determining the amount of paid vacation to which she is entitled for that year, which body of rules is to be appealed to, that governing new employees (three-week max with the caveat) or that governing senior employees (presumably longer)? If it is the former, Jennifer will indeed be only entitled to three weeks (assuming there is no other way to get extra paid vacation), as AC B asserts, but if it is the latter, Jennifer could potentially be entitled to more than three weeks. This eliminates AC B.
But AC A also does not need to be true. We are told of one way in which Jennifer could make her paid vacation longer, but what if there are other ways? Perhaps for any given year, as a function of their performance in the previous year, all employees may be eligible to up to three weeks of paid vacation in addition to the base? Perhaps Jennifer did spend all her paid vacation last year but earned extra vacation by having stellar performance. It seems to me that AC A is a sufficient assumption but not a necessary one.
Doesn’t “often” just mean “sometimes”? I eliminated this AC because I thought Jolene would also agree. After all, they concede that “some shrimp farms have proved unsustainable and have been quickly abandoned.” #help
This makes so much sense!! I got to the correct AC by elimination, but I just couldn’t see for the longest time how it’s an NA because I was adopting the first interpretation. Hate it when the LSAC allows this to happen.
AC C is wrong because for it to weaken, we need the additional assumption that it has been persuasively established that those “most animals that carry rabies” do need to be removed from buildings, in which case the comparison would provide support for the conclusion that bats, like those animals, also need to be removed from buildings, which would badly weaken Pratt’s argument. But what if it has been persuasively established that none of those animals actually pose enough risk for their removal from buildings to be warranted? Then the comparison created by AC C would actually strengthen Pratt’s argument.
AC B is difficult because the first part (“less mobile”) either has no impact or even strengthens, but the second part (“more aggressive”) weakens by neutralizing the effect of Pratt’s premise: even though bats are typically shy and rarely bite, when they are rabid, they get super aggressive and bite every single person that happens to be in their way.
We know that in the context of junkyards, demand for the older car parts is lowish, and salability of the younger car parts is highish. From the general principle we can deduce that salability of the older car parts is lowish, but we have no way of knowing the demand for the younger car parts (though luckily for us, the argument does not need to assume anything about this). We thus know that the salability of the older car parts is lower than that of the young car parts in the context of junkyards. From here, we only need the part/whole assumption and the sampling assumption applied in either order to get the conclusion.
The argument has two classic flaws. In assuming that the salability of car parts accurately reflects the salability of cars, it commits the part/whole flaw. In assuming that what is true about demand and salability in the context of junkyard sales holds generally, it commits the sampling flaw. The correct AC addresses the part/whole flaw, even though it could just as easily have decided to address the sampling flaw.
The author concludes from certain advantages of painted paper and disadvantages of paint that painted paper should be used for a certain goal. Two kinds of assumptions are involved: analogical and conditional. From the analogical point of view, the author has to assume that the advantages mentioned of painted paper are not shared by paint, and conversely the disadvantages mentioned of paint are not shared by painted paper.
AC A almost says this but ends up being a little too strong. We only need the varying textures to interfere with the pure effect of the color itself to a lesser degree in the case of painted paper than in the case of paint. Perhaps the varying textures produce a smaller range of variations in the effect of the same color in a given context in the case of painted paper than in the case of paint, but we do not need this range to collapse to a singleton in the case painted paper, as AC A suggests we do.
From the conditional point of view, there is a gap between the cited advantages of painted paper and the goal we are interested in achieving. If these advantages are not at all useful for the achieving of the goal, the argument would be severely weakened. In other words, the author has to assume that these advantages are at least somewhat conducive to the fulfillment of the goal. And this is exactly what AC D says.
I find that one reason some difficult questions are difficult is because multiple kinds of reasoning are involved but the correct AC tends to address the least obvious one.
There are two gaps in the argument. Our author assumes that, first, a book that gives pleasure is intended by its author to give pleasure and that, second, at least some of what is written is not true in a book whose author cannot impart to the readers the truth of their subject matter. Also, our author argues by contradiction, so she assumes the opposite of the final term of the conditional chain. Our author assumes, in other words, that it is not the case at least some of what is written in any popular book is not true. There are also the standard assumptions on the LSAT that (✱) if it is the case that P, it is reasonable to say that P, that (✱✱) if it is the case that /P, it is not reasonable to say that P, and that (✱✱✱) if it is reasonable to say that P and it is reasonable to say that Q, it is reasonable to say that P & Q. We also recall from basic logic that (✱✱✱✱) if A → (B → C) and C → D, then A → (B → D) and that (✱✱✱✱✱) if (A → B) → A, then (A → B) → B.
The argument structure is clear enough other than the part where a proposition is repeated in different words. The author is basically spelling out the details for us: by “one could determine the truthfulness of a book simply by looking at its sales figures,” she means “[i]f the book were very popular, one could reasonably conclude that it gave people pleasure.”
The argument is thus reconstructed as follows:
P1. If it is the case that the author of a book that intends to give pleasure by writing the book cannot impart to their readers the truth of their subject matter, then it is the case that it is reasonable to say that a popular book gives pleasure.
A1. A book that gives pleasure is intended by its author to give pleasure.
C1. If it is the case that the author of a book that intends to give pleasure by writing the book cannot impart to their readers the truth of their subject matter, then it is the case that it is reasonable to say that a popular book is intended by its author to give pleasure. (By P1, A1, ✱, ✱✱✱, ✱✱✱✱)
C2. If it is the case that the author of a book that intends to give pleasure by writing the book cannot impart to their readers the truth of their subject matter, then it is the case that it is reasonable to say that the author of a popular book cannot impart to their readers the truth of their subject matter. (By C1, ✱✱✱✱✱)
A2. If the author of a book cannot impart to their readers the truth of their subject matter, at least some of what is written in the book is not true.
C3. If it is the case that the author of a book that intends to give pleasure by writing the book cannot impart to their readers the truth of their subject matter, then it is the case that it is reasonable to say that the at least some of what is written in a popular book is not true. (By C2, A2, ✱, ✱✱✱)
A3. It is not the case that at least some of what is written in any popular book is not true.
C4. It is not reasonable to say that at least some of what is written in any popular book is not true. (By A3 and ✱✱)
C5. It is not the case that the author of a book that intends to give pleasure by writing the book cannot impart to their readers the truth of their subject matter. (By C4 and A3)
Proof of C1.
From A1 and ✱ we know that (p1) it is reasonable to say that a book that gives pleasure is intended by its author to give pleasure. From P1, p1, and ✱✱✱✱ we know that (p2) if it is the case that the author of a book that intends to give pleasure by writing the book cannot impart to their readers the truth of their subject matter, then it is the case that it is reasonable to say that a popular book gives pleasure and it is reasonable to say that a book that gives pleasure is intended by its author to give pleasure. From p2 and ✱✱✱ we know that if it is the case that the author of a book that intends to give pleasure by writing the book cannot impart to their readers the truth of their subject matter, then it is the case that it is reasonable to say that a popular book gives pleasure and a book that gives pleasure is intended by its author to give pleasure. It immediately follows that if it is the case that the author of a book that intends to give pleasure by writing the book cannot impart to their readers the truth of their subject matter, then it is the case that it is reasonable to say that a popular book is intended by its author to give pleasure. □
The key to this question is that we must be careful to distinguish between two levels of propositions, propositions about the surveyed physicians and propositions that are their beliefs. The correct AC is obtained by applying “most + most > some” twice, once at each level.
Let M denote the proposition that most of the surveyed physicians are influenced by gifts, and N the proposition that most of the surveyed physicians are not influenced by gifts. Clearly M and N form a mutually inconsistent list of propositions, since together they would imply that some of the surveyed physicians are both influenced and not influenced by gifts. This is the first application of “most + most > some.”
P1: Most of the surveyed physicians believe that they themselves are not influenced by gifts.
P2: Most of the surveyed physicians believe that N.
C1: Some of the surveyed physicians believe that they themselves are not influenced by gifts and that N. (From P1, P2; this is the second application of “most + most > some”)
A1: A consequence of these two beliefs is that M & N. (And we know from above that this is a mutually inconsistent list)
A2: For any list of propositions Γ, if a consequence of Γ is a mutually inconsistent list of propositions, one believing that Γ is mistaken in believing at least one of the propositions of Γ.
C2: Some of the surveyed physicians are mistaken about either their belief that they themselves are not influenced by gifts or their belief that most of the surveyed physicians are influenced by gifts. (From C1, A1, A2)
Q22 A vs C
I chose C at first but switched to A because I thought C was too narrow. The author does spend more time talking about how Tollefson’s work insightfully identifies these assumptions, but Tollefson is also concerned with the economic dimension, as shown by the first half of the second paragraph and the problems identified and solutions proposed in the last paragraph. So I thought “economic and cultural factors” summarized the passage really well by covering both of these aspects. However, A is descriptively inaccurate to the extent that it misplaces the focus on “adjusting to a new country” when Tollefson’s work as represented by the author is more concerned with the programs. C is incomplete but descriptively accurate and hence the superior AC.
Q18 A vs E
It can be persuasively argued that “impolitic” captures well the author’s opinion on authenticity with respect to transcribed autobiographies. But the stem asks us about the author’s take on authenticity with respect to autobiographies in general, and “ostensible” covers in addition to the case of transcribed autobiographies that of ghostwritten autobiographies.
Q27
We have three possibilities: noncohesive groups, cohesive groups with groupthink, cohesive groups without groupthink. The first two avoid objections (noncohesive groups directly, cohesive groups with groupthink indirectly), whereas the third takes part in constructive backandforths where participants are fully comfortable expressing their opinions and therefore exploration of a wide range of issues is permitted. AC B is thus supported.
What if the drivers who are used to breaking the current speed limits are just way better drivers than those who don’t typically break the current speed limits, so that once the new speed limits are in place, most of those who obey current speed limits increase their speed but, since they are not good enough to be driving at such speeds, get involved in a significant amount of accidents? This would strengthen the argument.
Another reason why E is wrong is because it’s too weak. Enthusiasm for new educational aids is only “often” not proportional to the pedagogical effectiveness of those devices. Even if “often” is changed to “most,” it’s not clear if the case of the calculators conforms to or falls outside the generalization. It can thus either strengthen, weaken, or have no effect. If “often” is changed to “always,” however, I think it should be ok as a direct conclusion strengthener.
Q26
I also chose D because I thought it was supported by the last paragraph. Maybe Amsden did not know about the Chief White Antelope blanket or any other specimen that would demonstrate that the stylistic shift had started prior to Anglo contact. But what if Amsden was actually aware of the evidence but simply failed to draw the conclusion that our author did for some other reason? Perhaps Amsden mistakenly thought that the Chief White Antelope blanket was not produced until after Anglo contact. AC D is thus not well supported.
AC C on the other hand is well supported. The last three paragraphs each point out an aspect of Navajo weaving that Amsden’s argument overlooks. First, no complete change in habits and thought processes would be necessary in the case of the stylistic shift in Navajo weaving in question. Second, artists that have exhausted the creative possibilities of their artistic principles in general tend to revise those principles to experiment with new possibilities, and there is no reason to suppose that the Navajo weavers constitute an exception. Third, evidence suggests that the stylistic shift was gradual and had started before Anglo contact. The “certain aspects” in AC C map to the discussion in these paragraphs.
From a structural perspective, AC C is also superior. Whereas AC C covers all three paragraphs of the author’s critique of Amsden’s argument, AC D at best only covers the last paragraph.
The study shows that children who engage in impulsive behavior are more likely to have the gene variant. In other words, there is a correlation between the gene variant and impulsive behavior. The implicit conclusion from the study is that there is a causal relationship between the gene variant and impulsive behavior. And since the impulsive behavior of these children resemble thrill-seeking behavior in adults, the author concludes that the gene variant causes people to tend to behave in a thrill-seeking way.
The gap between impulsive behavior and thrill-seeking behavior is the most obvious flaw. The second most obvious flaw is the move from correlation to causation. That the correct AC does not address either makes the question difficult.
A is weak (“many”) and requires the assumption that impulsive adults tend to behave in a thrill-seeking manner.
B looks irrelevant at first, but by showing that the study does not support the correlation reading, it undermines the connection between the gene variant and impulsive behavior.
C might be construed as a strengthener but is probably better taken to be irrelevant. We care about the connection between the two kinds of behavior, not about what a group of people tend to believe about this connection, and we know that beliefs are not necessarily reliable.
D is open to interpretation and either weakens, strengthens, or is irrelevant. If children that do not behave in an impulsive or thrill-seeking manner invariably grow up to behave in a thrill-averting manner, the link between the impulsive behavior and thrill-seeking behavior is weakened. If the children that behave impulsively but not in a thrill-seeking manner invariably grow up to behave in a thrill-seeking manner, the link between the two kinds of behavior is strengthened. If the behavioral tendencies involved do not include either impulsiveness or thrill-seeking, our argument is untouched.
E is irrelevant. If the gene is also correlated to procrastinating behavior so that most people with the gene tend to exhibit both thrill-seeking behavior and procrastination, our argument is untouched.
I thought “explicit” referred to explicit functions as opposed to implicit functions. We’re basically given a function K that maps each stage K(n) of the construction to the next stage K(n+1) with K(K(n)) = K(n+1), and the Koch curve would be defined as the infinite intersection of K(n) with n ranging over the natural numbers plus zero (K(0) being the line with no bumps).
Also, fractals are so fun. Please don’t let this passage stop you from learning more about this fascinating topic. Math students have the same complaint that textbook writers for some reason typically prefer to spend paragraphs describing concepts in words that everybody can get immediately if you just show them a picture. The age old bias of logos supremacy I guess 😮💨
You seem to have misinterpreted JY’s remarks to mean that the inference is not always logically permissible on the LSAT. What he seems to be saying rather is that, for a question on the LSAT that has as part of its stimulus or answer choices the word “few,” while correctly answering the question sometimes depends on making the inference, there are times when it does not.