J.Y.'s explanation for why (A) is wrong is not worded well. He makes it sound like A is wrong because the stimulus and the (A) are "about vastly different things," and that (A) is "meta" by talking about the logic of an argument. The implication that the correct answer should be specifically about the situation of the premier and cabinet, and not abstract.

In fact, answer (B) is an abstraction and is just as "meta," I think, as any of the other answers.

@kroper4 I came to the comments for the same thing. The opposite of /(trained) IS NOT (well-trained); on the contrary, per the lesson on distinguishing between opposites v. negations, the opposite of /(trained) would be merely (trained), which could mean (well-trained) but needn’t mean that by necessity.

I found these helpful for the negative comparisons (because of the fact that, e.g., if "A is no more [quality X] than B," then A can be equally [quality X] as B or less [quality X] than than B, but not more of a quality than B). Otherwise, though, I think this method is overcomplicating something that doesn't need it. I know how comparisons work.

I hate doing this on a laptop. I need to annotate things and cover up the answers so I'm not distracted, and it pisses me off that LSAC makes you take it digitally.

To those confused by "I'm hugging you because I miss you" — I was in the same boat, but after some Googling and thinking, I offer this explanation:

Every time you use "because," you're giving the reason for something happening, and that's obviously what we have in the hugging instance.

But take this sentence, "The dog is loose because the owner took off its leash." It also uses because in a way that gives the reason; just as in the hugging sentence, it's answering the question "why?" However, this time we're talking about the cause, not just the circumstances surrounding the event or the motivation.

It's a very fine distinction, but the "reason" for something is slightly different from the "cause" of something. As in the hugging example, the reason for doing something might just indicate intent, even if that intent doesn't lead in and of itself to anything physical or otherwise causal.

So, I would venture to say that all uses of "because" give a reason — but not all uses of "because" seek to explain causality as that reason. (The same way all circles are ovals, but not all ovals are circles.)